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ABSTRACT
The impacts of information revolution are omnipresent from life to work. The web
services have significantly changed our living styles in daily life, such as Facebook for communication and Wikipedia for knowledge acquirement. Besides, varieties of information systems, such as data management system and management information system, make us work
more efficiently. However, it is usually a double-edged sword. With the popularity of web services, relevant security issues are arising, such as fake news on Facebook and vandalism on
Wikipedia, which definitely impose severe security threats to OSNs and their legitimate participants. Likewise, office automation incurs another challenging security issue, insider threat,
which may involve the theft of confidential information, the theft of intellectual property, or
the sabotage of computer systems. A recent survey says that 27% of all cyber crime incidents
are suspected to be committed by the insiders. As a result, how to flag out these malicious
web users or insiders is urgent. The fast development of machine learning (ML) techniques
offers an unprecedented opportunity to build some ML models that can assist humans to
detect the individuals who conduct misbehaviors automatically. However, unlike some static
outlier detection scenarios where ML models have achieved promising performance, the malicious behaviors conducted by humans are often dynamic. Such dynamic behaviors lead to
various unique challenges of dynamic fraud detection:
• Unavailability of sufficient labeled data — traditional machine learning approaches
usually require a balanced training dataset consisting of normal and abnormal samples.
In practice, however, there are far fewer abnormal labeled samples than normal ones.
• Lack of high quality labels — the labeled training records often have the time gap
between the time that fraudulent users commit fraudulent actions and the time that

they are suspended by the platforms.
• Time-evolving nature — users are always changing their behaviors over time.
To address the aforementioned challenges, in this dissertation, we conduct a systematic study
for dynamic fraud detection, with a focus on: (1) Unavailability of labeled data: we present
(a) a few-shot learning framework to handle the extremely imbalanced dataset that abnormal
samples are far fewer than the normal ones and (b) a one-class fraud detection method using
a complementary GAN (Generative Adversarial Network) to adaptively generate potential
abnormal samples; (2) Lack of high-quality labels: we develop a neural survival analysis
model for fraud early detection to deal with the time gap; (3) Time-evolving nature: we
propose (a) a hierarchical neural temporal point process model and (b) a dynamic Dirichlet
marked Hawkes process model for fraud detection.
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1.1

Introduction

Motivation
Information revolution, which was emerging in 1990s, brings a far-reaching influence

to our society from life to work. The web services, such as online social networks (OSNs)
and knowledge bases, have gained much attention in recent years. Social networks, such as
Twitter and Facebook, have attracted a large number of people and are changing humans
daily lives. One recent study says that, until 2019, active social media users have passed the
3.8 billion and these users spend over 2 hours per day [1]. Our working environment is also
significantly influenced by the information revolution. The applicability of various information systems (IS), such as data management system, management information system and
customer relationship management, has contributed to the improvement of productivity and
efficiency. However, it is usually a double-edged sword. As we are obsessed in the prosperity
of information age, some potential security issues arrive unconsciously. For instance, due to
the openness of social media, some Twitter users who are induced by the commercial benefits, are spreading the rumors to misguide the public opinion, especially as some specific
big events are coming. Bunches of fraudulent accounts also exist in Facebook to do harm
to the community eco-system. A survey says that millions of people fell for Facebook scams
in 2014: they lost money, reputation and even their jobs after simply clicking on the wrong
social media link [2]. Similarly, with the popularity of office automation, organizations suffer
from insider threats which originate from people that have been given access rights to an IS
and misuse their privileges, thus violating the IS security policy of the organization [3]. The
2018 U.S. State of Cybercrime Survey indicates that 25% of the cyberattacks are committed
1

by insiders [4]. Information revolution brings us not only benefits but also security issues.
Therefore, it becomes a challenging problem how to detect these fraudulent web users or
malicious insiders. For the sake of simplicity, we call the malicious users in social media
platforms as web frauds and denote as insiders the employees who take advantage of their
access to inflict harm on an organization.
In practice, to flag out these fraudsters, there are some experienced investigators on
each social network platform. Usually, they undergo several years of professional training
and have a good discrimination for misbehaviors. However, facing the floods of Tweets and
thousands of fresh news on Facebook walls every day, limited human labor investigation
seems to be trivial. More importantly, the behavior patterns of web frauds are prone to be
dynamic in nature. As a result, it could incur a high false-alarm rate if a fixed set of empirical
rules are applicable to the detection. In addition, except for some objective criteria, human
decisions are often subject to a variety of conscious and unconscious biases which easily
bring a totally different judge for the same activity. Therefore, only depending on human
investigation, web fraud detection is infeasible. Insider threat detection mostly replies on the
exploitation of audit data. The dynamic, subtle, and multi-phase nature of insider attacks
makes detection extremely difficult. So, insider threat detection also faces the similar issues:
time-evolving behavior patterns and a tremendous volume of auditing records which can not
be dealt with by limited human labors. Overall, it is very critical to build some data-driven
tools which can provide insights into the existing investigation processes and aid human
investigators to make the final decision.
Nowadays, machine learning models have been widely used in automating various
tasks traditionally performed by humans such as character recognition, image classification, sentiment analysis and translation. Also, machine learning techniques may offer an
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unprecedented opportunity to develop a dynamic fraud detection framework with a focus on
time-evolving misbehaviors. However, the effectiveness of such frameworks is challenged by
the following issues:
• Unavailability of sufficient labeled data — traditional machine learning approaches
usually require a balanced training dataset consisting of positive (normal) and negative
(abnormal) samples. In practice, however, there are far fewer negative labeled samples
than positive ones.
• Lack of high quality labels — the labeled training records often have the time gap
between the time that fraudulent users commit fraudulent actions and the time that
they are suspended by the platforms.
• Time-evolving nature — users are changing their behaviors over time.
First, a tremendous volume of negative samples (frauds) are usually unavailable in practice
although, in some cases, few of them could be provided. As a result, with an extremely imbalanced dataset or even a one-class dataset, it would be infeasible to train a detection model in
a traditional supervised manner. Second, in dynamic fraud detection, the misbehavior labeling is often delayed due to the limited discrimination capability or the cautiousness to judge
a fraud: considering low false-alarm, platform administrators would rather conduct a longer
observation for a suspicious user than judging it as a fraud immediately. As a consequence,
at the testing phase, the trained model can not detect the misbehaviors in real time due to
the late-response labels. Third, normal users and frauds are both changing their behaviors
over time. Meanwhile, following the changes of normal users, frauds adapt their behavior
patterns to avoid the detection, which makes the abnormal fraudulent messages more subtle
and difficult to capture.
3

1.2

Overview and Summary of Contributions
This dissertation is carried out around one general question of “how do we leverage

machine learning techniques to build a model for dynamic fraud or insider threat detection?”
More specifically, this dissertation addresses the following challenges:
• How do we build a machine learning model with only positive samples for dynamic
fraud detection? (Chapter 3)
• How do we avail few negative samples to improve the discrimination capability of the
trained model for misbehavior detection? (Chapter 4)
• How do we adapt the late-response labels for an early detection in a dynamic manner?
(Chapter 5)
• How do we develop a multi-scale fraud detection method to capture the subtle and
time-evolving misbehavior? (Chapter 6, Chapter 7)
The overall structure of the dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 introduces some basic
preliminaries and related work. The main technical contributions are discussed in Chapter
3-7. In Chapter 3, we present a novel one-class adversarial neural net for web fraud detection
with only positive data. To involve few negative samples to enhance the detection capability
of the trained model, in Chapter 4, we propose a few-shot learning framework for insider fraud
detection. With late-response labels, Chapter 5 delivers a neural survival analysis model for
web fraud early detection. Chapter 6 outlines a neural hierarchical temporal point process
model for insider fraud detection, in which it captures the abnormal fraudulent messages in
a multi-scale, intra-session and inter-session. Chapter 7 provides a Dirichlet Hawkes process
model for insider fraud detection in which user modes are adaptively generated to capture
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the time-evolving behavior in a multi-scale manner. Chapter 8 delivers the final conclusions
and future works.

1.3

A One-class Fraud Detection Model with Generative Adversarial Neural
Net
Wikipedia is a multilingual online encyclopedia website: users can freely check or

re-edit any wikipedia pages they are interested in; the edits contributed by users could be reverted by the administrators but the edit reversion does not mean that this user is fraudulent
since the misleading edit may be due to lack of the domain knowledge. Therefore, in practice,
for fraud detection on Wikipedia, the biggest challenge is lack of two-class labels: although
it is not so much difficult to discriminate between right and wrong edits, however, it should
be very challenging to claim one user as a fraud because you can not mark someone as fraud
only depending on several edit reversions that may be led by shortage of domain knowledges.
In Chapter 3, we propose a one-class fraud detection framework with only positive samples.
The key contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• To capture the user’s dynamic editing behavior, we develop an LSTM-autoencoder to
embed the variational-length editing sequence into a fixed-length latent vector.
• We pretrain a multilayer perceptron (MLP) neural network to capture the empirical
distribution of positive samples.
• We propose a complementary generative adversarial net (GAN) model for one-class
fraud detection: rather than the distribution of positive samples, generator aims to
approaching the complementary distribution of positive samples and, instead of fooling
the discriminator, the iterative training procedure is to equip the discriminator with
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a strong capability to distinguish positive samples and the complementary of positive
samples, i.e. potential negative samples.

1.4

A Few-shot Learning Model for Insider Fraud Detection
Chapter 3 focuses on the scenario that there are only positive samples available.

Noticeably, another case does exist as well that, besides positive samples, there are few
negative samples while they can not support a supervised learning procedure due to its small
volume. Therefore, it has become a challenge how to adjust these negative samples into the
training phase. Some one-class models take these negative samples as a validation dataset to
tune the decision boundary in the training phase. In contrast, Chapter 4 introduces a novel
few-shot learning framework to involve few negative samples for insider fraud detection in a
different way. The key contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• We propose a two phase training framework to improve the performance of insider
fraud detection.
• Second, unlike most of the existing work for insider fraud detection that only consider
the activity type information, we explicitly encode the activity time information into
the model via the input representations.
• Evaluation results show that, compared with typical baselines, such as one-class SVM
and isolation forest, the proposed few-shot learning framework achieves a better performance.
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1.5

A Neural Survival Analysis Model for Fraud Early Detection
Lack of high-quality labels is another challenge for the web fraud detection, i.e. there is

usually a time gap between the times when a user conduct a misbehavior and it is suspended
by the platform. To reduce the time gap and flag the fraudulent users as early as possible,
Chapter 5 proposes a neural survival analysis model for fraud early detection. The key
distributions of this chapter are as follows:
• We propose a novel survival analysis model to capture users’ time-varying behavior
patterns across discrete timestamps in which Recurrent Neural Network is used to
learn the hazard rates along the time.
• We revise the likelihood loss function to adapt the training data with late response
labels for fraud early detection.
• We conduct the evaluation on two real-world datasets and the proposed model outperforms state-of-the-art fraud detection approaches.

1.6

A Hierarchical Temporal Point Process model for Insider Fraud Detection
The time-evolving nature of insider attacks makes detection extremely difficult. Rather

than a single-and-coarse scale framework, which has been discussed in the aforementioned
chapters, Chapter 6 involves continuous physical time and proposes a hierarchical neural temporal point process model by combining the temporal point processes and recurrent neural
networks for insider threat detection. This model is capable of capturing a general nonlinear
dependency over the action history in two inherent levels: intra-session and inter-session.
The key contributions are as follows:
• Time point process is used to model the temporal dynamics in a activity streaming.
7

• The proposed model can capture the time information in a multi-scale manner.
• Evaluation results show that, compared with some state-of-the-art baselines, the proposed hierarchical time point process model achieves a better performance.

1.7

A Dirichlet Hawkes Process Model for Insider Fraud Detection
Chapter 7 involves the Dirichlet process and proposes a dynamic mixture model in

which user mode can be adaptively generated to adjust the users’ time-varying behavior
patterns. Noticeably, the model proposed in Chapter 6 is session-oriented while the model
proposed in Chapter 7 is activity-oriented. Therefore, compared with the former, the latter
should be more flexible and sensitive in capturing the time-evolving behavior patterns of
users for dynamic fraud detection. The key contributions of this work are as follows:
• We develop an unsupervised dynamic mixture model for fraud detection.
• The proposed model can effectively capture the sequence of user activities with unbounded number of user modes.
• Evaluation results demonstrate the effectiveness of our model for the dynamic fraud
detection on an activity streaming.
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2

Preliminaries

2.1

Related Work
In this section, we briefly summarize the related work in two aspects: application

scenarios and techniques.

2.1.1

Fraud Detection
Many fraud detection techniques have been developed in recent years [5, 6, 7, 8, 9],

including content-based approaches and graph-based approaches. The content-based approaches extract content features, (i.e., text, URL), to identify malicious users from user
activities on social networks [10]. Research in [11] focused on predicting whether a Wikipedia
user is a vandal by identifying a set of behavior features based on user edit-patterns. To improve detection accuracy and avoid manual feature construction, a multi-source long-short
term memory network (M-LSTM) was proposed to detect vandals [12]. Meanwhile, graphbased approaches identify frauds based on network topologies. Often based on unsupervised
learning, the graph-based approaches consider fraud as anomalies and extract various graph
features associated with nodes, edges, ego-net, or communities from the graph [5, 13, 8, 14].

2.1.2

Fraud Early Detection
The misleading or fake information spread by malicious users could lead to catas-

trophic consequences because the openness of online social media enables the information
to be spread in a timely manner. Therefore, detecting fake information or malicious users
is a critical research topic [8, 15, 14, 13, 9]. In recent years, extensive studies focus on the
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rumor early detection [16, 17]. Besides early detecting the fake information, early detecting
the malicious users who create the fake information is also important. [11, 12] aim to early
detect vandals in Wikipedia. All the existing approaches adopt classification models for fraud
early detection. In this work, we combine the survival analysis with RNN to predict whether
a user is a fraudster.

2.1.3

Insider Threat Detection
Insider attacks are increasingly sophisticated cyber-attacks by people that have the

capability, intent, and domain knowledge about the system. Given different attack intentions,
insiders can be categorized into three types: traitors, masqueraders and unintentional perpetrators. Traitors usually misuse their privileges to commit malicious activities; masqueraders
refer to the people who often conduct illegal actions on behalf of legitimate employees of
an institute; unintentional perpetrators are benign users who unintentionally make mistakes
[18].
An insider attack is often hidden among a huge number of normal activities. The
subtle and dynamic nature of insider attacks makes detection extremely difficult. It becomes
a key challenge on how to describe and capture the insider’ behaviors for insider threat detection. To handle this challenge, in recent years, varieties of insider detection algorithms
are proposed. For example, anomaly detection algorithms, such as one-class SVM, are usually adopted for insider detection [19]. Meanwhile, rather than detecting the insiders, several
approaches are proposed to detect fine-grained insider threats, e.g., whether there are malicious activities in a day. The idea is that we treat the employee’s actions over a period of
time as a sequence. The sequences that are frequently observed are normal behavior, while
the sequences that are seldom observed are abnormal behavior that could be from insiders.
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To model the user activity sequences, researchers adopt Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) to
capture the behaviors of normal employees [20]. As a result, any employee activity sequences
with low probability predicted by HMMs could indicate an abnormal sequence. Recently, the
recurrent neural network is also adopted to detect malicious sequences based on manually
designed input features [21]. In addition, some other supervised and unsupervised learning
algorithms, such as Self Organizing Maps (SOM) and Decision Trees (DT), are also employed
for insider threat detection [22]. However, there is still no discussion on how to enhance the
performance of insider threat detection with a few observed insiders. To handle this problem,
in this work, we propose a few-shot learning based method for insider threat detection.

2.1.4

One-class Classification
One-class classification (OCC) algorithms aim to build classification models when

only one class of samples are observed and the other class of samples are absent [23], which
is also related to the novelty detection [24]. One-class support vector machine (OCSVM), as
one of widely adopted for one class classification, aims to separate one class of samples from
all the others by constructing a hyper-sphere around the observed data samples [25, 26].
Other traditional classification models also extend to the one-class scenario. For example,
one-class nearest neighbor (OCNN) [27] predicts the class of a sample based on its distance
to its nearest neighbor in the training dataset. One-class Gaussian process (OCGP) chooses
a proper GP prior and derives membership scores for one-class classification [28]. However,
OCNN and OCGP need to set a threshold to detect another class of data. The threshold is
either set by a domain expert or tuned based on a small set of two-class labeled data. In
this work, we propose a framework that combines LSTM-Autoencoder and GAN to detect
vandals with only knowing benign users. To our best knowledge, this is the first work that
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examines the use of deep learning models for fraud detection when only one-class training
data is available. Meanwhile, comparing to existing one-class algorithms, our model trains
a classifier by generating a large number of “novel” data and does not require any labeled
data to tune parameters.

2.1.5

Few-shot Learning
Few-shot learning (FSL) aims to learn new tasks from a limited amount of supervised

information [29]. FSL plays as a testbed for AI since human can learn tasks by only observing
a few samples. Meanwhile, FSL is also suitable for tasks where labeled data is hard to acquire.
Due to the importance of generalization capability for a learning model, FSL has attracted
increasing attention these years [30].
The few-shot learning algorithms can be categorized into metric-based and metalearning based approaches. The main idea of metric-based approaches is to predict a new
sample by comparing the sample with the limited observed samples. For example, Siamese
Neural Network consists of twin networks which are identical to each other and learn the
relationship between pairs of input data by metric-learning losses [31]. Matching Network
predicts the new sample by using a weighted K-nearest neighbor classifier measured by the
cosine distance [32]. Relation Network combines the embeddings of a new sample with the
support samples and adopts a neural network to learn a distance between a new sample and
each class of samples [33]. The meta-learning approaches are usually called learning to learn
algorithms, which learn a new task by the limited samples and the meta knowledge extracted
across tasks by a meta-learner. There are two classical meta learning approaches, MemoryAugmented Neural Network (MANN) and Model-Agnostic Meta-Learning (MAML). MANN
adopts a controller (e.g., LSTM) to interact with an external memory that stores class label
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information with a few labeled data [34]. MAML creates a model agnostic method that has
a meta objective being optimized by a small number of gradient updates, leading to fast
learning on a new task [35].
Unlike many few-shot learning tasks with C(C > 2) classes, the insider threat detection task only has two classes and limited malicious samples. As a result, the comparison
pairs that can be generated from the dataset are also limited. In this work, we propose a
framework that is able to leverage a large amount of audit data and a small number of
malicious samples.

2.1.6

Survival Analysis
Survival analysis is to analyze and model the data where the outcome is the time

until the occurrence of an event of interest [36]. In survival analysis, the occurrence of an
event is not always observed in an observation window, which is called censored.
Survival analysis is a widely-used tool in health data analysis [37, 38, 39] and has been
applied to various application fields, such as students dropout time [40], web user return time
[41, 42, 43], and user check-in time prediction [44]. To our knowledge, the survival analysis
has not been investigated in the context of fraud detection.
Many approaches have been proposed to make use of censored data as well as the
event data. The Cox proportional hazards model (CPH) [45] is the most widely-used model
for survival analysis. CPH is semi-parametric and does not make any assumption about the
distribution of event occurrence time. It is typically learned by optimizing a partial likelihood
function. However, CPH makes strong assumptions that the log-risk of an event is a linear
combination of covariates, and the base hazard rate is constant over time. Some researchers
proposed parametric censored models, which assume the event occurrence time follows a
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specific distribution such as exponential, log-logistic or Weibull [46, 38, 47]. However, it is
common that the specific parametric assumptions are not satisfied in real data.
In recent years, researchers adopt neural networks to model the survival distribution
[48, 49, 50, 51, 52]. For example, [48, 49] combine the feed-forward neural network with the
classical Cox proportional hazard model. Although using the deep neural network can improve the capacity of models, these studies still assume that the base hazard rate is constant.
[50] transfers the problem of learning the distribution of survival time to a discretized-time
classification problem and adopts the deep feed forward neural network to predict the survival time. [51] adopts a conditional generative adversarial network to predict the event time
conditioned on covariates, which implicitly specifies a time-to-event distribution via sampling. However, the existing models cannot handle the time-varying covariates. In this work,
we adopt the RNN to take the time-varying covariates as inputs and fit the time-to-event
distribution without making any of the above assumptions.
We also notice that some studies adopt RNN to model the time-to-event distributions.
Those studies mainly focus on modeling the recurrent event instead of the terminated event.
For example, [42, 41, 53] adopt RNN to model the web user return times, which focus on
the recurrent event data other than the censored data. Hence, RNN is to capture the gap
time between user active sessions. Moreover, unlike the existing work that focuses on “justin-time” prediction, we adapt the survival analysis for fraud early detection in the scenario
where training data contains late response labels.

2.1.7

Temporal Point Process
A temporal point process (TPP) is a stochastic process composed of a time series

of events that occur in continuous time [54]. The temporal point process is widely used for
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modeling the sequence data with time information, such as health-care analysis, earthquakes
and aftershocks modeling and social network analysis [55, 56, 57]. The traditional methods
of temporal point processes usually make parametric assumptions about how the observed
events are generated, e.g., by Poisson processes or self-exciting point processes. If the data do
not follow the prior knowledge, the parametric point processes may have poor performance.
To address this problem, researchers propose to learn a general representation of the dynamic
data based on neural networks without assuming parametric forms [42, 58]. Those models are
trained by maximizing log likelihood. Recently, there are also emerging works incorporating
the objective function from generative adversarial network [59, 60] or reinforcement learning
[61] to further improve the model performance. However, the current TPP models only focus
on one granularity of time. In our scenario, we propose a hierarchical RNN framework to
model the multi-scale time information.

2.2

Datasets
We evaluate the proposed models, which will be detailed in the following chapters,

mainly on two real-world datasets and one synthetic dataset. In this section, we provide a
basic introduction for all of them.

2.2.1

Wikipedia
Wikipedia dataset origins from UMDWikipedia dataset [11] in which there are around

770K edits from Jan 2013 to July 2014 (19 months) with 17105 vandals and 17105 benign
users and Each user edits a sequence of Wikipedia pages.
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2.2.2

Twitter
We randomly collect 51608 Twitter users on August 13, 2017, monitor the user sta-

tuses every three days until October 13, 2017, and get the data with 21 timestamps. For each
user, at each timestamp, the following 5 features are recorded: 1) the number of followers, 2)
the number of followees, 3) the number of tweets, 4) the number of liked tweets, and 5) the
number of public lists that the user is a member of. During this period, 7790 users (15.0%)
are suspended; the remaining 43818 users (85.0%) are still active.

2.2.3

CERT
We adopt the CERT Insider Threat Dataset [62], which is the only comprehensive

dataset publicly available for evaluating the insider threat detection. This dataset consists of
five log files that record the computer-based activities for all employees, including logon.csv
that records the logon and logoff operations of all employees, email.csv that records all
the email operations (send or receive), http.csv that records all the web browsing (visit,
download, or upload) operations, file.csv that records activities (open, write, copy or delete)
involving a removable media device, and decive.csv that records the usage of a thumb drive
(connect or disconnect). The CERT dataset also has the ground truth that indicates the
malicious activities committed by insiders. We use the latest version (r6.2) of CERT dataset
that contains 3995 benign employees and 5 insiders.
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3

One-Class Adversarial Nets for Fraud Detection

Problem Statement: How do we build a machine learning model with only positive samples
for dynamic fraud detection?
In this chapter, we will first review the background of the problem, then formulate the
problem and present the proposed method. The real-world Wikipedia dataset will be availed
to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed method by comparing with the state-of-the-art
baselines.

3.1

Introduction
Online platforms such as online social networks (OSNs) and knowledge bases play

a major role in online communication and knowledge sharing. However, there are various
malicious users who conduct various fraudulent actions, such as spams, rumors, and vandalism, imposing severe security threats to OSNs and their legitimate participants. To protect
legitimate users, most Web platforms have tools or mechanisms to block malicious users. For
example, Wikipedia adopts ClueBot NG to detect and revert obvious bad edits, thus helping
administrators to identify and block vandals.
Detecting malicious users has also attracted increasing attention in the research community [63, 64, 15, 11, 12]. However, these detection models are trained over a training dataset
that consists of both positive data (benign users) and negative data (malicious users). In
practice, there are often no or very few records from malicious users in the collected training
data. Manually labeling a large number of malicious users is tedious.
In this work, we tackle the problem of identifying malicious users when only benign
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users are observed. The basic idea is to adopt a generative model to generate malicious
users with only given benign users. Generative adversarial networks (GAN) as generative
models have demonstrated impressive performance in modeling the real data distribution
and generating high quality synthetic data that is similar to real data [65, 66]. However,
given benign users, a regular GAN model is unable to generate malicious users.
We develop one-class adversarial nets (OCAN) for fraud detection. During training,
OCAN contains two phases. First, OCAN adopts the LSTM-Autoencoder [67] to encode the
benign users into a hidden space based on their online activities, and the encoded vectors are
called benign user representations. Then, OCAN trains improved generative adversarial nets
in which the discriminator is trained to be a classifier for distinguishing benign users and
malicious users with the generator producing potential malicious users. To this end, we adopt
the idea of bad GAN [68] that the generator is trained to generate complementary samples
instead of matching the original data distribution. The generator of the complementary GAN
aims to generate samples that are complementary to the representations of benign users, i.e.,
the potential malicious users. We revise the objective function of the discriminator in the
regular GAN to achieve one-class classification. The discriminator is trained to separate
benign users and complementary samples. Since the behaviors of malicious users and that of
benign users are complementary, we expect the discriminator can distinguish benign users
and malicious users. By combining the encoder of LSTM-Autoencoder and the discriminator
of the complementary GAN, OCAN can accurately predict whether a new user is benign or
malicious based on his online activities.
The advantages of OCAN for fraud detection are as follows. First, since OCAN does
not require any information about malicious users, we do not need to manually compose a
mixed training dataset, thus more adaptive to different types of malicious user identification
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tasks. Second, different from existing one-class classification models, OCAN generates complementary samples of benign users and trains the discriminator to separate complementary
samples from benign users, enabling the trained discriminator to better separate malicious
users from benign users. Third, OCAN can capture the sequential information of user activities. After training, the detection model can adaptively update a user representation once
the user commits a new action and predict whether the user is a fraud or not dynamically.
Note that this chapter is originally from the published work [69].

3.2

Generative Adversarial Nets
Generative adversarial nets (GAN) are generative models that consist of two compo-

nents: a generator G and a discriminator D. Typically, both G and D are multilayer neural
networks. G(z) generates fake samples from a prior pz on a noise variable z and learns a
generative distribution pG to match the real data distribution pdata . On the contrary, the
discriminative model D is a binary classifier that predicts whether an input is a real data x
or a generated fake data from G(z). Hence, the objective function of D is defined as:

max
D

Ex∼pdata [log D(x)] + Ez∼pz [log(1 − D(G(z)))],

(3.1)

where D(·) outputs the probability that · is from the real data rather than the generated
fake data. In order to make the generative distribution pG close to the real data distribution
pdata , G is trained by fooling the discriminator not be able to distinguish the generated data
from the real data. Thus, the objective function of G is defined as:

min
G

Ez∼pz [log(1 − D(G(z)))].

(3.2)

19

Minimizing the Equation 3.2 is achieved if the discriminator is fooled by generated data G(z)
and predicts high probability that G(z) is real data.
Overall, GAN is formalized as a minimax game min max V (G, D) with the value
G

D

function:
V (G, D) = Ex∼pdata [log D(x)] + Ez∼pz [log(1 − D(G(z)))].

(3.3)

Figure 3.1: The training framework of OCAN

3.3
3.3.1

OCAN: One-Class Adversarial Nets
Framework Overview
OCAN contains two phases during training. The first phase is to learn user repre-

sentations. As shown in the left side of Figure 3.1, LSTM-Autoencoder is adopted to learn
benign user representations from benign user activity sequences. The LSTM-Autoencoder
model is a sequence-to-sequence model that consists of two LSTM models as the encoder
and decoder respectively. The encoder computes hidden representations of inputs, and the
decoder computes the reconstructed inputs based on the hidden representations. The trained
LSTM-Autoencoder can capture the salient information of users’ activity sequences because
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the objective function is to make the reconstructed input close to the original input. The
encoder of the trained LSTM-Autoencoder, when deployed for fraud detection, is expected
to map the benign users and malicious users to relatively separate regions in the continuous
feature space because the activity sequences of benign and malicious users are different.
Given the user representations, the second phase is to train a complementary GAN
with a discriminator that can clearly distinguish the benign and malicious users. The generator of the complementary GAN aims to generate complementary samples that are in the
low-density area of benign users, and the discriminator aims to separate the real and complementary benign users. The discriminator then has the ability to detect malicious users which
locate in separate regions from benign users. The framework of training complementary GAN
is shown in the right side of Figure 3.1.
The pseudo-code of training OCAN is shown in Algorithm 1. Given a training dataset
Mbenign that contains activity sequence feature vectors of N benign users, we first train the
LSTM-Autoencoder model (Lines 3–9). After training the LSTM-Autoencoder, we adopt
the encoder in the LSTM-Autoencoder model to compute the benign user representation
(Lines 11–14). Finally, we use the benign user representation to train the complementary
GAN (Lines 16–20). For simplicity, we write the algorithm with a minibatch size of 1, i.e.,
iterating each user in the training dataset to train LSTM-Autoencoder and GAN. In practice,
we sample m real benign users and use the generator to generate m complementary samples
in a minibatch. In our experiments, the size of minibatch is 32.
Our OCAN moves beyond the naive approach of adopting a regular GAN model in
the second phase. The generator of a regular GAN aims to generate the representations of
fake benign users that are close to the representations of real benign users. The discriminator
of a regular GAN is to identify whether an input is a representation of a real benign user or
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a fake benign user from the generator. However, one potential drawback of the regular GAN
is that once the discriminator is converged, the discriminator cannot have high confidence
on separating real benign users from real malicious users. We denote the OCAN with the
regular GAN as OCAN-r and compare its performance with OCAN in the experiment.
Algorithm 1: Training One-Class Adversarial Nets
Inputs : Training dataset Mbenign = {X1 , · · · , XN },
Training epochs for LSTM-Autoencoder
EpochAE and GAN EpochGAN
Outputs: Well-trained LSTM-Autoencoder and complementary GAN
1

initialize parameters in LSTM-Autoencoder and complementary GAN;

2

j ← 0;

3

while j < EpochAE do

4

foreach user u in Mbenign do

5

compute the reconstructed sequence of user activities by LSTM-Autoencoder (Eq. 3.4, 3.6, and 3.7);

6

optimize the parameters in LSTM-Autoencoder with the loss function Eq. 3.8;

7

end

8

j ← j + 1;

9

end

10

V = ∅;

11

foreach user u in Mbenign do

12

compute the benign user representation vu by the encoder of LSTM-Autoencoder (Eq. 3.4, 3.5);

13

V+ = vu ;

14

end

15

j ← 0;

16

while j < EpochGAN do

17

foreach benign user representation vu in V do
optimize the discriminator D and generator G with loss functions Eq. 3.14, 3.12, respectively;

18
19

3.3.2

end

20

end
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return well-trained LSTM-Autoencoder and complementary GAN

LSTM-Autoencoder for User Representation
The first phase of OCAN is to encode users to a continuous hidden space. Since each

online user has a sequence of activities (e.g., edit a sequence of pages), we adopt LSTMAutoencoder to transform a variable-length user activity sequence into a fixed-dimension
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user representation. Formally, given a user u with T activities, we represent the activity
sequence as Xu = (x1 , . . . , xt , . . . , xT ) where xt ∈ Rd is the t-th activity feature vector.
Encoder: The encoder encodes the user activity sequence Xu to a user representation
with an LSTM model:
en
en
hen
t = LST M (xt , ht−1 ),

(3.4)

where xt is the feature vector of the t-th activity; hen
t indicates the t-th hidden vector of the
encoder.
The last hidden vector hen
T captures the information of a whole user activity sequence
and is considered as the user representation v:

v = hen
T .

(3.5)

Decoder: In our model, the decoder adopts the user representation v as the input
to reconstruct the original user activity sequence X :

de
de
hde
t = LST M (v, ht−1 ),

x̂t = f (hde
t ),

(3.6)
(3.7)

where hde
t is the t-th hidden vector of the decoder; x̂t indicates the t-th reconstructed activity
feature vector; f (·) denotes a neural network to compute the sequence outputs from hidden
vectors of the decoder. Note that we adopt v as input of the whole sequence of the decoder,
which has achieved great performance on sequence-to-sequence models [70].
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The objective function of LSTM-Autoencoder is:

L(AE) (x̂t , xt ) =

T
X

(x̂t − xt )2 ,

(3.8)

t=1

where xt (x̂t ) is the t-th (reconstructed) activity feature vector. After training, the last
hidden vector of encoder hT can reconstruct the sequence of user feature vectors. Thus, the
representation of user v = hen
T captures the salient information of user behavior.

3.3.3

Complementary GAN
The generator G of complementary GAN is the same as that of the bad GAN in [68].

Basically, it is a feedforward neural network where its output layer has the same dimension as
the user representation v. Formally, we define the generated samples as ṽ = G(z). Unlike the
generator in a regular GAN which is trained to match the distribution of the generated fake
benign user representation with that of benign user representation pdata , the generator G of
complementary GAN learns a generative distribution pG that is close to the complementary
distribution p∗ of the benign user representations, i.e., pG = p∗ .
Following [68], we define the complementary distribution p* as:

∗

p (ṽ) =





 τ1 p



C

1
data (ṽ)

if pdata (ṽ) >  and ṽ ∈ Bv
(3.9)
if pdata (ṽ) ≤  and ṽ ∈ Bv ,

where  is a threshold to indicate whether the generated samples are in high-density regions;
τ is a normalization term; C is a small constant; Bv is the space of user representation.
To make the generative distribution pG close to the complementary distribution p∗ , the
complementary generator G is trained to minimize the KL divergence between pG and p∗ .
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Based on the definition of KL divergence, the objective function is:

LKL(pG kp∗ ) = −H(pG ) − Eṽ∼pG log p∗ (ṽ)
= −H(pG ) + Eṽ∼pG log pdata (ṽ)1[pdata (ṽ) > ]

(3.10)

+ Eṽ∼pG (1[pdata (ṽ) > ] log τ − 1[pdata (ṽ) ≤ ] log C),
where H(·) is the entropy, and 1[·] is the indicator function. The last term of Equation 3.10
can be omitted because both τ and C are constant terms and the gradients of the indicator
function 1[·] with respect to parameters of the generator are mostly zero.
Meanwhile, following [68], the complementary generator G adopts the feature matching loss [71] to ensure that the generated samples are constrained in the space of user representation Bv .
Lfm =k Eṽ∼pG f (ṽ) − Ev∼pdata f (v) k22 ,

(3.11)

where f (·) denotes the output of an intermediate layer of the discriminator used as a feature
representation of v.
Thus, the complete objective function of the generator is defined as:

min
G

− H(pG ) + Eṽ∼pG log pdata (ṽ)1[pdata (ṽ) > ]
(3.12)
+ k Eṽ∼pG f (ṽ) − Ev∼pdata f (v) k22 .

Overall, the objective function of the complementary generator aims to let the generative
distribution pG close to the complementary samples p∗ , i.e., pG = p∗ , and make the generated
samples from different regions (but in the same space of user representations) than those of
the benign users.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the difference of the generators of regular GAN and complemen-
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tary GAN. The objective function of the generator of regular GAN in Equation 3.2 is trained
to fool the discriminator by generating fake benign users similar to the real benign users.
Hence, as shown in Figure 3.3.3, the generator of regular GAN generates the distribution of
fake benign users that have the similar distribution of real benign users in the feature space.
On the contrary, the objective function of the generator of complementary GAN in Equation
3.12 is trained to generate complementary samples that are in the low-density regions of
benign users (shown in Figure 3.3.3).

(a) Regular GAN

(b) Complementary GAN

Figure 3.2: Demonstrations of the ideal generators of regular GAN and complementary
GAN. The blue dot line indicates the high density regions of benign users.

To optimize the objective function of generator, we need to approximate the entropy of
generated samples H(pG ) and the probability distribution of real samples pdata . To minimize
−H(pG ), following [68], we adopt the pull-away term (PT) proposed by [72] that encourages
the generated feature vectors to be orthogonal. The PT term increases the diversity of
generated samples and can be considered as a proxy for minimizing −H(pG ). The PT term
is defined as
N

LP T =

N

XX
f (ṽi )T f (ṽj )
1
(
)2 ,
N (N − 1) i j6=i k f (ṽi ) kk f (ṽj ) k

(3.13)

where N is the size of a mini-batch.
The probability distribution of real samples pdata is usually unavailable, and approximating pdata is computationally expensive. In this paper, we adopt the approach proposed
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by [73] that a discriminator from a regular GAN can detect whether the data from the real
data distribution pdata or from the generator’s distribution. The basic idea is that the discriminator is able to detect whether a sample is from the real data distribution pdata or from
the generator when the generator is trained to generate samples that are close to real benign users. Hence, the discriminator is sufficient to identify the data points that are above a
threshold of pdata during training. We separately train a regular GAN model based on benign
user representations and use the discriminator of the regular GAN as a proxy to evaluate
pdata (ṽ) > .
The discriminator D takes the benign user representation v and generated user representation ṽ as inputs and tries to distinguish v from ṽ. As a classifier, D is a standard
feedforward neural network with a softmax function as its output layer, and we define the
objective function of D as:

max Ev∼pdata [log D(v)] + Eṽ∼pG [log(1 − D(ṽ))]+
D

(3.14)
Ev∼pdata [D(v) log D(v)].

Different from the objective function of the discriminator introduced in the bad GAN for
the purpose of semi-supervised learning, we revise the objective function of D in our complementary GAN based on the regular GAN. The first two terms in Equation 3.14 are the
objective function of discriminator in the regular GAN model. Therefore, the discriminator
of complementary GAN is trained to separate the benign users and complementary samples.
The last term in Equation 3.14 is a conditional entropy term which encourages the discriminator to detect real benign users with high confidence. Then, the discriminator is able to
separate the benign and malicious users clearly.
Although the objective functions of the discriminators of regular GAN and comple-
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mentary GAN are similar, the capabilities of discriminators of regular GAN and complementary GAN for malicious detection are different. The discriminator of regular GAN aims
to separate the benign users and generated fake benign users. However, after training, the
generated fake benign users locate in the same regions as the real benign users (shown in
Figure 3.3.3). The probabilities of real and generated fake benign users predicted by the
discriminator of regular GAN are all close to 0.5. Thus, giving a benign user, the discriminator cannot predict the benign user with high confidence. On the contrary, the discriminator
of complementary GAN is trained to separate the benign users and generated complementary samples. Since the generated complementary samples have the same distribution as the
malicious users (shown in Figure 3.3.3), the discriminator of complementary GAN can also
detect the malicious users.

Figure 3.3: The fraud detection model

3.4

Fraud Detection Model
Although the training procedure of OCAN contains two phases that train LSTM-

Autoencoder and complementary GAN successively, the fraud detection model is an endto-end model. We illustrate its structure in Figure 3.3. To detect a malicious user, we first
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compute the user representation vu based on the encoder in the LSTM-Autoencoder model
(Equations 3.4 and 3.5). Then, we predict the user label based on the discriminator of
complementary GAN, i.e., p(ŷu |vu ) = D(vu ).
Early fraud detection: The upper-left region of Figure 3.3 shows that our OCAN
model can also achieve early detection of malicious users. Given a user u, at each step t, the
hidden states hen
ut are updated until the t-th step by taking the current feature vector xut as
input and are able to capture the user behavior information until the t-th step. Thus, the user
representation at the t-th step is denoted as vut = hen
ut . Finally, we can use the discriminator
D to calculate the probability p(ŷut |vut ) = D(vut ) of the user to be a malicious user based
on the current step user representation vt .

3.5

Experiments
Table 3.1: Vandal detection results (mean±std.) on precision, recall and F1
Input

Raw feature vector

User representation
User representation

3.5.1

Algorithm
OCNN
OCGP
OCSVM
OCNN
OCGP
OCSVM
OCAN
OCAN-r

Precision
0.5680 ± 0.0129
0.5767 ± 0.0087
0.6631 ± 0.0057
0.8314 ± 0.0351
0.8381±, 0.0225
0.6558 ± 0.0058
0.9067 ± 0.0615
0.8673 ± 0.0355

Recall
0.8646 ± 0.0599
0.9000 ± 0.0560
0.9829 ± 0.0011
0.8028 ± 0.0476
0.8289 ± 0.0374
0.9590 ± 0.0096
0.9292 ± 0.0348
0.8759 ± 0.0529

F1
0.6845 ± 0.0184
0.7023 ± 0.0193
0.7919 ± 0.0040
0.8150 ± 0.0163
0.8326 ± 0.0158
0.7789 ± 0.0064
0.9010 ± 0.0228
0.8701 ± 0.0267

Experiment Setup

Dataset: To evaluate OCAN, we conduct our evaluation on Wikipedia dataset, in which we
focus on one type of malicious users, i.e., vandals on Wikipedia. We keep those users with
the lengths of edit sequence ranging from 4 to 50 and, after that, the dataset contains 10528
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benign users and 11495 vandals. To compose the feature vector xt of the user’s t-th edit,
we adopt the following edit features: (1) whether or not the user edited on a meta-page; (2)
whether or not the user consecutively edited the pages less than 1 minutes; (3) whether or
not the user’s current edit page had been edited before; (4) whether or not the user’s current
edit would be reverted.
Hyperparameters: For LSTM-Autoencoder, the dimension of the hidden layer is 200,
and the training epoch is 20. For the complementary GAN model, both discriminator and
generator are feedforward neural networks. Specifically, the discriminator contains 2 hidden
layers which are 100 and 50 dimensions. The generator takes the 50 dimensions of noise as
input, and there is one hidden layer with 100 dimensions. The output layer of the generator
has the same dimension as the user representation which is 200 in our experiments. The
training epoch of complementary GAN is 50. The threshold  defined in Equation 3.12 is set
as the 5-quantile probability of real benign users predicted by a pre-trained discriminator.
We evaluated several values from 4-quantile to 10-quantile and found the results are not
sensitive.

Repeatability: Our software together with the datasets are available online https://github.com/PanpanZh

3.5.2

Comparison with One-Class Classification

Baselines: We compare OCAN with the following widely used one-class classification approaches:
• One-class nearest neighbors (OCNN) [27] labels a testing sample based on the distance
from the sample to its nearest neighbors in training dataset and the average distance
of those nearest neighbors.
• One-class Gaussian process (OCGP) [28] is a one-class classification model based on
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Gaussian process regression.
• One-class SVM (OCSVM) [25] adopts support vector machine to learn a decision
hypersphere around the positive data, and considers samples located outside this hypersphere as anomalies.
For baslines, we use the implementation provided in NDtool. The hyperparameters of
baselines set as default values in NDtool. Note that both OCNN and OCGP require a small
portion (5% in our experiments) of vandals as a validation dataset to tune an appropriate
threshold for vandal detection. However, OCAN does not require any vandals for training
and validation. Since the baselines are not sequence models, we compare OCAN to baselines
in two ways. First, we concatenate all the edit feature vectors of a user to a raw feature vector
as an input to baselines. Second, the baselines have the same inputs as the discriminator, i.e.,
the user representation v computed from the encoder of LSTM-Autoencoder. Meanwhile,
OCAN cannot adopt the raw feature vectors as inputs to detect vandals. This is because
GAN is only suitable for real-valued data [65].
To evaluate the performance of vandal detection, we randomly select 7000 benign
users as the training dataset and 3000 benign users and 3000 vandals as the testing dataset.
We report the mean value and standard deviation based on 10 different runs. Table 3.1 shows
the means and standard deviations of the precision, recall, F1 score for vandal detection.
First, OCAN achieves better performances than baselines in terms of F1 score in both input
settings. It means the discriminator of complementary GAN can be used as a one-class
classifier for vandal detection. We can further observe that when the baselines adopt the raw
feature vector instead of user representation, the performances of both OCNN and OCGP
decrease significantly. It indicates that the user representations computed by the encoder of
LSTM-Autoencoder capture the salient information about user behavior and can improve
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the performance of one-class classifiers. However, we also notice that the standard deviations
of OCAN are higher than the baselines with user representations as inputs. We argue that
this is because GAN is widely known for difficult to train. Thus, the stability of OCAN is
relatively lower than the baselines.
Furthermore, we show the experimental results of OCAN-r, which adopts the regular
GAN model instead of the complementary GAN in the second training phase of OCAN, in
the last row of Table 3.1. We can observe that the performance of OCAN is better than
OCAN-r. It indicates that the discriminator of complementary GAN which is trained on real
and complementary samples can more accurately separate the benign users and vandals.
Table 3.2: Early detection results on precision, recall, F1, and the average number of edits
before the vandals are blocked

M-LSTM

OCAN
OCAN-r

3.5.3

Vandals
7000
1000
400
300
100
0
0

Precision
0.8416
0.9189
0.9639
0.0000
0.0000
0.8014
0.7228

Recall
0.9637
0.8910
0.6767
0.0000
0.0000
0.9081
0.8968

F1
0.8985
0.9047
0.7951
0.0000
0.0000
0.8459
0.7874

Edits
7.21
5.98
3.64
0.00
0.00
7.23
7.18

Comparison with M-LSTM for Early Vandal Detection
We further compare the performance of OCAN in terms of early vandal detection with

one latest deep learning based vandal detection model, M-LSTM, developed in [12]. Note
that M-LSTM assumes a training dataset that contains both vandals and benign users. In
our experiments, we train our OCAN with the training data consisting of 7000 benign users
and no vandals and train M-LSTM with a training data consisting the same 7000 benign
users and a varying number of vandals (from 7000 to 100). For OCAN and M-LSTM, we
use the same testing dataset that contains 3000 benign users and 3000 vandals. Note that
in OCAN and M-LSTM, the hidden state hen
t of the LSTM model captures the up-to-date
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(a) Prob. predicted by OCAN

(b) Prob. predicted by OCAN-r

(c) F1 score of OCAN

(d) F1 score of OCAN-r

Figure 3.4: Training progresses of OCAN (3.5.2,3.5.2) and OCAN-r(3.5.2,3.5.2). Three lines
in Figures 3.5.2 and 3.5.2 indicate the probabilities of benign users predicted by the discriminator: real benign users p(y|vB ) (green line) vs. generated samples p(y|ṽ) (red broken line)
vs. real malicious users p(y|vM ) (blue dotted line). Figures 3.5.2 and 3.5.2 show the F1 of
OCAN and OCAN-r during training.
user behavior information and hence we can achieve early vandal detection. The difference
is that the M-LSTM model uses hen
t as the input of a classifier directly whereas OCAN
further trains complementary GAN and uses its discriminator as a classifier to make the
early vandal detection. In this experiment, instead of applying the classifier on the final user
representation v = hen
T , the classifiers of M-LSTM and OCAN are applied on each step of
LSTM hidden state hen
t and predict whether a user is a vandal after the user commits the
t-th action.
Table 3.2 shows comparison results in terms of the precision, recall, F1 of early vandal
detection, and the average number of edits before the vandals were truly blocked. We can
observe that OCAN achieves a comparable performance as the M-LSTM when the number
of vandals in the training dataset is large (1000, 4000, and 7000). However, M-LSTM has
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very poor accuracy when the number of vandals in the training dataset is small. In fact, we
observe that M-LSTM could not detect any vandal when the training dataset contains less
than 400 vandals. On the contrary, OCAN does not need any vandal in the training data.
The experimental results of OCAN-r for early vandal detection are shown in the last
row of Table 3.2. OCAN-r outperforms M-LSTM when M-LSTM is trained on a small number
of the training dataset. However, the OCAN-r is not as good as OCAN. It indicates that
generating complementary samples to train the discriminator can improve the performance
of the discriminator for vandal detection.

3.5.4

OCAN Framework Analysis

Complementary GAN vs. Regular GAN: In our OCAN model, the generator of complementary GAN aims to generate complementary samples that lie in the low-density region of
real samples, and the discriminator is trained to detect the real and complementary samples.
We examine the training progress of OCAN in terms of predication accuracy. We calculate
probabilities of real benign users p(y|vB ) (shown as green line in Figure 3.5.2), malicious
users p(y|vM ) (blue dotted line) and generated samples p(y|ṽ) (read broken line) being benign users predicted by the discriminator of complementary GAN on the testing dataset
after each training epoch. We can observe that after OCAN is converged, the probabilities of
malicious users predicted by the discriminator of complementary GAN are much lower than
that of benign users. For example, at the epoch 40, the average probability of real benign
users p(y|vB ) predicted by OCAN is around 70%, while that of malicious users p(y|vM ) is
only around 30%. Meanwhile, the average probability of generated complementary samples
p(y|ṽ) lies between the probabilities of benign and malicious users.
On the contrary, the generator of a regular GAN in the OCAN-r model generates fake

34

samples that are close to real samples, and the discriminator of GAN focuses on distinguishing
the real and generated fake samples. As shown in Figure 3.5.2, the probabilities of real
benign users and probabilities of malicious users predicted by the discriminator of regular
GAN become close to each other during training. After the OCAN-r is converged, both
the probabilities of real benign users and malicious users are close to 0.5. Meanwhile, the
probability of generated samples is similar to the probabilities of real benign users and
malicious users.
We also show the F1 scores of OCAN and OCAN-r on the testing dataset after each
training epoch in Figure 3.5.2 and 3.5.2. We can observe that the F1 score of OCAN-r is
not as stable as (and also a bit lower than) OCAN. This is because the outputs of the
discriminator for real and fake samples are close to 0.5 after the regular GAN is converged.
If the probabilities of real benign users predicted by the discriminator of the regular GAN
swing around 0.5, the accuracy of vandal detection will fluctuate accordingly.
We can observe from Figure 3.4 another nice property of OCAN compared with
OCAN-r for fraud detection, i.e., OCAN is converged faster than OCAN-r. We can observe
that OCAN is converged with only training 20 epochs while the OCAN-r requires nearly
100 epochs to keep stable. This is because the complementary GAN is trained to separate
the benign and malicious users while the regular GAN mainly aims to generate fake samples
that match the real samples. In general, matching two distributions requires more training
epochs than separating two distributions. Meanwhile, the feature matching term adopted in
the generator of complementary GAN is also able to improve the training process [71].
Visualization of three types of users: We project the user representations of the three
types of users (i.e., benign, vandal and complementary benign generated by OCAN) to a twodimensional space by Isomap [74] and show the projection in Figure 5. We observe that the
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Figure 3.5: 2D visualization of three types of users: real benign (blue star), vandal (cyan
triangle), and complementary benign (red dot)
generated complementary users lie in the low-density regions of real benign users. Meanwhile,
the generated samples are also between the benign users and vandals. Since the discriminator
is trained to separate the benign and complementary benign users, the discriminator is able
to separate benign users and vandals.

3.6

Summary
In this chapter, we have developed OCAN for fraud detection when only benign users

are available during the training phase. We conducted experiments on a real world dataset
and showed that OCAN outperforms the state-of-the-art one-class classification models.
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4

Few-shot Insider Threat Detection

Problem Statement: How do we avail few negative samples to improve the discrimination
capability of the trained model for fraud detection ?
In this chapter, we first give a brief introduction to the problem background, then
define the problem and deliver the proposed method. Two datasets, CERT and Wikipedia,
will be utilized to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed method by comparing with the
state-of-the-art baselines.

4.1

Introduction
A malicious insider indicates an employee who intentionally used his authorized ac-

cess in a manner that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the
organization’s information [75]. The 2018 U.S. State of Cybercrime Survey indicates that
25% of the cyberattacks are committed by insiders [4].
Since the insiders’ behaviors are different from the behaviors of legitimate employees,
we can detect the insider threat by analyzing the employees’ behaviors via the audit data.
In general, user activities are often grouped into sessions that are separated by operations
like “LogOn” and “LogOff”. However, due to the small number of malicious sessions, the
classical supervised learning algorithms cannot be employed. Currently, several unsupervised
learning approaches are proposed to detect the malicious sessions [22, 20, 21].
However, in practice, we do know an extremely small number of insiders from the
historical data. Instead of unsupervised learning, how to leverage the observed insiders to improve the performance of insider detection is an interesting problem. To tackle this challenge,

37

in this paper, we propose a framework of combining the idea of self-supervised pre-training
[76] and metric-based few-shot learning to detect insiders [77, 33]. Specifically, we first design
input representations of user activities in sessions, which capture both activity type and time
information, and then adopt the transformer layer proposed in [78] to learn session representations. In order to achieve insider threat detection with only a small number of insiders,
our framework is trained by two phases. The first phase is to pre-train the transformer layer
by learning an “activity model” on a large number of user sessions. The pre-trained activity
model provides strong prior knowledge on how the user sessions are composed. Then, the
second phase is to fine-tune the model and learn a similarity function via few-shot learning
where the objective is to separate the normal and malicious sessions in the embedding space.
After training, new malicious sessions can be detected by having high similarity scores to
the observed malicious sessions.
The contributions of our framework are as follows. First, we propose a two-phase
training framework that leverages both a large amount of audit data and a small number
of observed insiders to improve the performance of the model on insider threat detection.
Second, unlike most of the existing works for insider threat detection that only consider
the activity type information, we explicitly encode the activity time information into the
model via the input representations. Third, experiments on a real insider threat dataset
demonstrate that compared with the one-class SVM and isolation forest that only use the
normal data and the recurrent neural network that is also trained by a few insiders, our
framework achieves the best performance on insider threat detection.
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4.2

Framework
We model a user’s behavior as a sequence of activities that can be extracted from

various types of raw data, such as user logins, emails, and Web browsing. Formally, we model
the up-to-date activities of a user as a sequence of sessions U = {S1 , · · · Sk , · · · } where
Sk = {ek1 , · · · , ekj , · · · , ekT } indicates the k-th activity session. One session in our scenario
is a sequence of activities starting with ‘LogOn” and ending with “LogOff”. ekj = (tkj , akj )
denotes the j-th activity in the user’s k-th session and contains activity type akj and occurred
time tkj .
Given an extremely unbalanced training set D = {(Si , yi )}m
i=1 , where Si is the ith session, and yi ∈ {0, 1} indicates malicious or not of the session, there is a very small
number of sessions that are labeled as malicious in D. Note that we consider the sessions
that contain malicious activities, such as uploading documents to Wikileak, as malicious
sessions. The goal of learning in our insider threat detection is to predict whether a new
session Sk = {ek1 , · · · , ekj , · · · , ekT } is normal or malicious. To address the challenge that
there are usually very few records of known insider attacks in the training data, we propose
a framework that takes advantages of both self-supervised pre-training and metric-based
few-shot learning. The pre-training phase uses the user activity sequence to learn session
representations by self-supervised learning, while the fine-tuning phase is to train a feedforward neural network with small parameters to derive the similarity scores among samples.
Figure 4.1 shows the architecture of our proposed framework.
Specifically, we design the input representations for activities in a session by combining the activity type and time information. In order to model the user sessions, we adopt
the architecture of transformer layer and use the similar idea as Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers (BERT) to pre-train the model [76]. After pre-training, we
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Figure 4.1: The architecture of our framework
fine-tune the model based on a few observed insiders to achieve malicious session detection.
The metric-based few-shot learning first computes the centers of normal and malicious
session representations as prototype representations of normal and malicious sessions and
then trains a neural network as a similarity function to compute similarity scores between user
sessions and prototype representations. Then, new malicious sessions expect to be detected
by having high similarity scores to the observed malicious sessions.

4.2.1

Self-supervised Pre-training

Input representation. Input representations aim to map user activities in a session into an
embedding space so that the transformer layer can encode the user activities into a session
representation. Given a user activity in a session, we have both activity type and time
information. The existing work only considers the activity type information, like uploading
documents to a removable disk or visiting a website. However, the timing of the user activity
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is also an important feature for malicious session detection. For example, an insider may copy
classified documents to a removable disk at midnight. Since both activity type and time are
important for insider threat detection, input representations should encode both type and
time information of user activities to our model. To this end, given an activity type and its
corresponding time, we map them to an embedding space. Then, the input representation of
the activity is constructed by summing the representations of type and time. The detailed
descriptions of the activity type and time representations are given as follows.
Type representations: To obtain type representations, we first consider each activity
type as a word in a sentence, each session as a sentence, and the activities of all users as a
text corpus. Then, we adopt the word2vec [79] to train the type representations A ∈ Ra∗d ,
where a is number of activity types.
Time representations: Similar to the position encodings [78], which aim to encode the
relative or absolute position information to the model, we propose the time representations
to inject the absolute time information of an activity to the input representation. Specifically,
we represent the activity time as the offset minute from 12:00 am. For example, if an activity
occurs at 1:00 am, we represent the time as 60 minutes past 12:00 am. As a result, the time
representations can be represented as T ∈ R1440∗d , where 1440 is the total number of minutes
in a day. There are two advantages to using absolute time representations. First, we can inject
the physical time information to the model. Second, since the transformer layer do not have
recurrent structure, the absolute time can also capture the order information of activities in a
session. We adopt the same sinusoid function as the position encoding in [78] to generate the
time representations, which is defined as Tt,2i = sin(t/100002i/d ); Tt,2i+1 = cos(t/100002i/d ),
where t is the t-th minute in a day; i is the i-th dimension of the d-dimensional representation.
The advantage of using sinusoid function is that it allows the model to easily learn to attend
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by relative positions, since for any fixed offset k, Tt+k can be represented as a linear function
of Tt .
Therefore, the input representation of the j-th activity in a session is defined as:

xj = aaj + ttj ,

(4.1)

where aj and tj indicate the indices of representations of type and time given the j-th activity.
The the input representation to the transformer can be represented as Xn∗d , where n indicates
the length of session. With the well-designed input representation, the transformer layer can
encode multiple aspects of user behaviors.
Pre-training. We adopt transformer layer to model the user activity sessions [78] and
use a similar strategy as BERT to pre-train the transformer layer [76]. In our scenario, we
consider the log files that record all the user activities as a pre-training corpus and adopt the
masked language model to pre-train the transformer layer. Specifically, the model takes all
activities in a session with random masks as inputs, where we randomly replace a small ratio
of activities in a session with a specific MASK token. The training object is to accurately
predict the randomly masked activity types. The purpose of predicting MASK token is to
make the transformer layer capture the user behaviors in terms of activity types and time.
Since the behaviors of normal and malicious sessions are different, we expect the transformer
layer could encode the prior knowledge of user behavior by training to predict the MASK
tokens.
In particular, the transformer layer consists of a multi-head self-attention and a
position-wise feed forward sub-layer in which a residual connection is employed around each
of two sub-layers, followed by layer normalization [80]. The multi-head attention employs h
parallel self-attentions to jointly capture different aspect information at different positions
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over the input activity sequence. Formally, for the j-th head of the attention layer, the scaled
dot-product self-attention is defined as:

headj = Attention(XWjQ , XWjK , XWjV ),

(4.2)

T

√
)V; X ∈ Rn∗d is the input representation of the
where Attention(Q, K, V) = sof tmax( QK
dv

session; WjQ , WjK and WjV are linear projection weights with dimensions Rd∗dv for the j-th
head. Each self-attention makes each activity attend to all the activities in an input session
and computes the hidden representation for each activity with an attention distribution over
the session.
The multi-head attention employs a parallel of self-attentions to jointly capture different aspect information at different activities. Formally, the multi-head attention concatenates
parallel heads together as:

f (X) = Concat(head1 , ..., headh )WO ,

(4.3)

where WO ∈ Rhdv ∗do is a projection matrix.
Then, the position-wise feed forward sub-layer with a ReLU activation is applied to
the hidden representation of each activity separately. Finally, by combining the position-wise
feed forward sub-layer and multi-head attention, a transformer layer is defined as:

transformer layer(X) = F F N (f (X))
(4.4)
= ReLU (f (X)W1 )W2 ,
where W1 and W2 are trained projection matrices.
After pre-training, similar to BERT, we consider the final hidden state of the first
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activity in the session, i.e., the hidden state of “LogOn”, as the session representation s:

s = transformer layer(X)[0],

(4.5)

where X ∈ Rn∗d is the input representation of a session. Given a large amount of session
sequences with random masks, the pre-training phase is trained to update the parameters

θt = {WjQ , WjK , WjV }hj=1 , WO , W1 , W2 in transformer layer.

4.2.2

Few-shot Fine-tuning.
After self-supervised pre-training, the session representations derived from trans-

former layer capture the information of user behaviors in terms of activity types and time.
We further fine-tune the session representations and design a similarity function to detect
insider threats via a small number of malicious sessions. Concretely, the few-shot learning
phase consists of two goals. The first goal is to fine-tune the transformer layer to make the
representations of normal and malicious sessions locate separately in the embedding space.
Then, we can derive prototype representations of normal and malicious sessions by adopting
the mean operation on the normal and malicious samples separately so that each prototype
representation is surrounded by sessions in that class. The second goal is to derive a similarity function to evaluate the similarity between a session and prototype representations. After
fine-tuning, a new malicious session expect to have a higher similarity score to the malicious
prototype representation.
In few-shot learning, each training iteration is formulated as a training episode. In
each episode, we randomly sample k normal sessions and k malicious sessions as the support
set S = {(Si , yi )}2∗k
i=1 , and further sample q samples from both normal and malicious sessions
as the query set Q = {(Sj , yj )}qj=1 from the training set. We then compute the representation
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of each session in the support and query set by Equation 4.5. We denote the representations
of Si from the support set and Sj from the query set as si and sj .
Based on the support set, we derive the prototype representations for normal and
malicious sessions by a mean operation over representations of normal and malicious sessions
separately:
cy =

1
k

X

si ,

(4.6)

(Si ,yi )∈Sy

where Sy indicates the set of samples with label y and y ∈ {0, 1}.
After obtaining two prototype representations from the support set, we further derive
the similarity scores of samples in the query set with the representation of each prototype.
To this end, we first combine the representation of a query sample with a prototype representation by a concatenate operation rjy = Concat(sj , cy ). Then, we adopt a fully connected
neural network as a similarity function to map the representation rjy to a similarity score
ljy :
ljy = g(rjy ; θg ),

(4.7)

where ljy measures the similarity between query sample j and prototype y ranging from 0
to 1; g(·) is a fully connected neural network parameterized by θg with a sigmoid function
as the final activation function.
We adopt the mean square error as the loss function to fine-tune the transformer layer
as well as the neural network g(·) [33]:
q
X X
(ljy − 1(yj == y))2 .
L=

(4.8)

y∈{0,1} j=1

The general idea is to consider the task as a regression problem. The training procedure is
to make the similarity score close to 1 if the query sample and prototype belong to the same
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Table 4.1: Statistics of two datasets
Dataset
CERT
Wikipedia

# of Employees
4000
4073

# of Insiders
5
822

# of Sessions
1,581,358
10,113

# of Malicious Sessions
48
4627

class, otherwise, the similarity score should be close to 0. In the fine-tuning phase, we update
the parameters θg in g(·) and fine-tune the parameters θt in transformer layer.
Detection. When we deploy the model for malicious session detection, we adopt all the
malicious sessions in the training set to compute the prototype representation of malicious
sessions and randomly sample the same number of normal sessions to compute the prototype
representation of normal sessions. Given an upcoming session as a new query set, we compute
its similarity scores with the two prototype representations. The upcoming session will be
detected as malicious if its similarity to the malicious prototype is higher than the one to
the normal prototype; otherwise, it is a normal session.

4.3

Experiments

4.3.1

Experimental Setup

4.3.1.1

Dataset

We evaluate our proposed approach on two datasets: CERT Insider Threat Dataset
[81] and UMDWikipedia Dataset [11]. For a summary, Table 4.1 shows the statistics of the
dataset.
CERT. A session is a sequence of user activities between “Logon” and “Logoff”.
Based on the activities recorded in the log files, we extract fine-grained activity types as
combinations of activity types and their context. For insider detection, the context of the
activity type, such as the name of the visited website, is also crucial for insider threat
detection. For example, a normal user usually uploads documents to websites which are
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related to their work, but a user who foresees his potential layoff may upload documents
to specific websites, like Dropbox or Wikileak. Hence, in our work, we design fined-grained
activity types by combining the context information with the activity types, such as, “upload
to website Wikileak.org”. As a result, we extract 1435 fine-grained activity types. We split
the dataset chronologically into a training set and a testing set. Without specific descriptions,
we use the sessions occurred in the first 396 days as the training set and the rest 120 days as
the testing set. There are 15 malicious sessions in the training set and 33 malicious sessions
in the testing set.
Training Details. In our experiments, the model consists of 2 transformer layers, and
the multi-head attention sub-layer consists of 4 heads. For transformer layers, the dimension
of each attention in multi-head attention sub-layer is 64, so the dimension of feed-forward
sub-layer is 256. For the CERT dataset, besides the time in a day, we further incorporate
the day in a week and is-working-time as activity time information. Specifically, each day
in a week is represented as day representations D ∈ R7∗d , and another embedding matrix
E ∈ R2∗d is to represent whether an activity occurs in working time. In our experiments,
we define the working time as Monday to Friday and 8am to 6pm. As a result, the input
representation for the CERT dataset is the sum of representations of activity type, time, day
in a week, and is-working-time. In the few-shot training phase, in each episode, we randomly
select 15 normal sessions and 15 malicious sessions to compose the support set. We augment
the malicious sessions by randomly shuffling activities between “LogOn” and “LogOff”.
Wikipedia. We can consider vandals as insiders in the Wikipedia community. Since
Wikipedia dataset does not have explicit indicators, such as LogON or LogOff, to split the
user activity sequence into sessions. We consider user activities in one day as a session. If the
session contains the activities that are reverted by administrators, the session is malicious;
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otherwise, this session is normal. We then filter out the session with activity numbers less
than 15. Table 4.1 shows the statistics of the dataset.
Training Details. To represent the type information, we adopt 7 binary features:
whether or not the user edited on a meta-page; if the edited page is a meta-page, whether or
not this meta-page is empty; whether or not the user consecutively edited the pages in less
than 1 minute, 3 minutes, or 15 minutes; whether or not the user’s current edit page had
been edited before; whether or not the current edit will be reverted by the platform later. For
each binary feature, we use a matrix A ∈ R2∗d as one type information. By summing of the
7 feature representations, we then get the type representation of an activity. The final input
representation is the sum of type and time representation. The architecture of transformer
layer is the same as the structure we used in CERT dataset. In the few-shot training stage,
for each episode, we randomly pick 50 normal sessions and 50 malicious sessions to construct
the support set.

4.3.1.2

Baselines

We compare our model with three baselines, Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) [82],
One-class SVM (OCSVM) [25] and Isolation Forest (iForest), in which One-class SVM
and Isolation Forest are for the case without any malicious samples and an adaptive fewshot recurrent Neural Network (RNN) is designed for the scenario that a small amount of
malicious samples are observed in insider threat detection. In the implementation, we take
advantage of scikit-learn for OCSVM and iForest and implement a few-shot RNN framework
based on the original work [82]. In addition, we replace the transformer layers with RNN and
adopt the same objective function defined in Equation 4.8 to train the RNN. For OCSVM
and iForest, we use activity types to compose the input feature vector, and the value of each
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Table 4.2: Comparison of our framework with baselines.
Dataset
CERT

Wikipedia

Models
OCSVM
iForest
RNN
Our model
OCSVM
iForest
RNN
Our model

Precision
0.0026
0.0056
0.3038
0.9200
0.5576
0.4920
0.9548
0.9920

Recall
0.8182
0.3939
0.7273
0.6970
0.9870
0.1230
0.8257
0.8626

F1
0.0051
0.0110
0.4286
0.7931
0.7126
0.1968
0.8856
0.9228

FPR
0.1818
0.6060
0.0055
0.0001
0.7830
0.1270
0.0393
0.0069

feature is the number of the corresponding activity in a session.

4.3.2

Experiment Results

Few-shot Malicious Session Detection. We apply the proposed method and baselines on
two real-world datasets, CERT Insider Threat and Wikipedia. Table 4.2 shows the precision,
recall, F1, and false positive rate (FPR). We can observe that, compared to baselines, our
proposed model achieves the best performance with F1 score 0.7931 and FPR 0.0001 on
CERT and F1 score 0.9228 and FPR 0.0069 on Wikipedia. Since OCSVM and iForest only
adopt normal sessions for training, we can notice that these two approaches cannot achieve
good performance for malicious session detection. Although OCSVM achieves high recall
value, the precision is extremely low. Since the RNN model is also trained in the same setting
of few-shot learning, it achieves better performance than OCSVM and iForest. However, the
F1 score of RNN is still lower than that of our model. It indicates that using transformer
layers with carefully designed input representations to model the user sessions can improve
the performance of few-shot malicious session detection.
Various numbers of malicious sessions in the training set. We further evaluate the
performance of our model trained by various numbers of malicious sessions in the training
set. Concretely, the number of malicious sessions is reduced from 15 to 5 for CERT while it
is changing from 50 to 5 for Wikipedia. Table 4.3 shows the experimental results. Overall,
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Table 4.3: Performance of our framework trained by various numbers of malicious sessions.
Dataset
CERT

Wikipedia

# of Malicious Sessions
5
8
10
15
5
15
30
50

Precision
0.0047
0.8824
0.7333
0.9200
0.4994
0.6939
0.9807
0.9920

Recall
0.8140
0.3750
0.5789
0.6970
0.9529
0.8440
0.8637
0.8626

F1
0.0096
0.5263
0.6471
0.7931
0.6554
0.7616
0.9185
0.9228

FPR
0.7194
0.0001
0.0007
0.0001
0.9497
0.3709
0.0171
0.0069

on both CERT and Wikipedia, F1 scores are decreasing as the number of malicious sessions
reduces. Meanwhile, we can observe that, even if with few malicious sessions, the proposed
few-shot insider threat detection model can still achieve a reasonable F1 score and a low
false positive rate. For CERT, given 10 malicious sessions, F1 score is 0.6471 and FPR is
0.0007. For Wikipedia, given 30 malicious sessions, F1 score is 0.9185 and FPR is 0.0171.
Ablation studies. In order to better understand the performance of our framework, we
conduct several ablation experiments. First, the input representations consist of two components, i.e., the representations of activity type and time. We train the model by removing
one of the components each time, rather than using all components. Meanwhile, since our
framework is trained by two phases, we also study the performance of the framework without pre-training or without few-shot fine-tuning the model. In the scenario without few-shot
fine-tuning, we adopt the L2-distance as the similarity score to label the sessions.
Table 4.4: Performance of our framework after removing various components.
w.o.
w.o.
w.o.
w.o.

type representation
time representation
pre-training
few-shot fine-tuning

Precision
0.1013
0.8519
0.8519
0.0085

Recall
0.2424
0.6970
0.6970
0.5758

F1
0.1429
0.7667
0.7667
0.0168

FPR
0.0070
0.0003
0.0003
0.2197

Table 4.4 shows the experimental results. As we expect, without using the representations of activity types in a session, the model cannot achieve malicious session detection.
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Meanwhile, by removing the time representations, the F1 score also slightly reduces. For the
two training phases, we can also notice that the performance of the model reduces without
pre-training, and the model cannot achieve reasonable performance without few-shot finetuning the model. It indicates that obtaining the prior knowledge about the user sessions
via pre-training can improve the model performance, while using a few malicious sessions in
the training process is the key to achieve malicious session detection.
Visualization. We adopt PCA to project the session embeddings to a two-dimensional space
and visualize the normal and malicious sessions. We adopt all the malicious sessions and the
same number of normal sessions in the training set to compute the prototype embeddings.
Then, we select all the malicious sessions and randomly choose 800 normal sessions from the
testing set. Figure 4.2 shows the visualization results of malicious and normal sessions as
well as two prototype representations before and after the few-shot learning phase. We can
observe that before the few-shot learning phase, the malicious and normal sessions are mixed
together, and the prototypes of malicious and normal sessions close to each other. After the
few-shot learning phase, the malicious and normal sessions are clearly separated into two
parts of the figure, and the prototypes of two types of sessions also have long distance in the
two-dimensional space. Meanwhile, all the normal sessions close to the prototype of normal
sessions, which explains the low false positive rates in our experiments. Moreover, most of
the malicious sessions close to the prototype of malicious sessions, and some of the malicious
sessions are in the area of the normal sessions. Hence, we can achieve high true positive rates,
and the recall of the malicious session detection is around 70%.

51

(a) Before few-shot learning

(b) After few-shot learning

Figure 4.2: The visualizations of sessions embeddings. The red and black dots indicate
the malicious and normal sessions, respectively, while the red and black star indicate the
prototype of malicious and normal session, respectively.
4.4

Summary
In this chapter, we have developed a novel framework that consists of two training

phases, self-supervised pre-training phase and few-shot learning phase, for insider threat
detection. Experimental results on an insider threat detection dataset demonstrated the
effectiveness of our framework.
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5

SAFE: A Neural Survival Analysis Model for Fraud Early Detection

Problem Statement: How do we utilize the late-response labels for fraud early detection?
In this chapter, we first introduce the problem background, then formulate the problem and present the proposed method. The two real-world datasets, Twitter and Wikipedia,
will be leveraged to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed method by comparing with
the state-of-the-art baselines.

5.1

Introduction
Due to the openness and anonymity of the Internet, online platforms (e.g., online

social media or knowledge bases) attract a large number of malicious users, such as vandals,
trolls, and sockpuppets. These malicious users impose severe security threats to online platforms and their legitimate participants. For example, the fraudsters on Twitter can easily
spread fake information or post harmful links on the platform. To protect legitimate users,
most web platforms deploy tools to detect fraudulent activities and further take actions (e.g.,
warning or suspending) against those malicious users. However, there is usually a gap between the time that fraudulent activities occur and the time that response actions are taken.
Training datasets collected and used for building new detection algorithms often contain
the labeled information about when users are suspended instead of when users take fraudulent actions. For example, using twitter streaming API and crawler can easily collect the
suspended time information of fraudsters in addition to a variety of dynamically changing
features (e.g., the number of posts or the number of followers). However, there is no ground
truth about when fraudulent activities occur from the collected data. Hence, the algorithms

53

trained on such datasets cannot achieve in-time or even early detection if they do not take
into consideration the gap between suspended time and fraudulent activity time. In this
work, we aim to develop effective fraud early detection algorithms over such training data
that contains time-varying features and late response labels.
Fraud early detection has attracted increasing attention in the research community
[11, 12, 16, 17]. The existing approaches for fraud early detection are usually based on
classification models (e.g., neural network, SVM). Given a sequence of user activities that
contain intermittent fraudulent activities, the prediction at each timestamp from the built
classifier is often independent to each other. Hence, these classification models tend to make
inconsistent and ad-hoc predictions along the time. Figure 5.1 shows an illustrative example.
A user takes a fraudulent action at time t2 , the classification model predicts the user as a
fraudster at t2 and t4 but as normal user at t3 . This is because the prediction probabilities
between consecutive timestamps do not have any relations.

Figure 5.1: Comparison of the survival analysis-based approach and classification-based approach for fraud early detection. Red square indicates that the user is predicted as fraudsters
at time t while the green circle indicates the user is predicted as normal.

In this work, we propose to use the survival analysis [83] to achieve consistent predictions along the time. Survival analysis models the time until an event of interest occurs
and incorporates two types of information: 1) whether an event occurs or not, and 2) when
the event occurs. In survival analysis, hazard rate and survival probability are adopted to
model event data. The hazard rate at time t indicates the instantaneous rate at which events
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occur, given no previous event whereas the survival probability indicates the probability that
a subject will survive past time t.
In the fraud detection scenario, the event is that a fraudster is suspended by the
platform. We use the survival function, which is monotonically decreasing, to model the
likelihood of being fraudster for a given user based on his observed activities. Hence, unlike
the classification model that makes ad-hoc predictions, the survival model can keep track
of user survival probabilities over time and provide consistent prediction. When deployed,
the survival analysis model can easily calculate the survival probability of a new user at
each timestamp based on his activities and predict the user as a fraudster when the survival
probability is below some threshold.
However, it is nontrivial to adopt survival analysis for fraud detection. Traditional
survival analysis models often assume a specific parametric distribution of underlying data.
However, it is generally unknown which distribution fits well in fraud detection scenarios. We
need a model to handle the features of user activity sequences (time-varying covariates) and
further capture general relationships between the survival time distribution and time-varying
covariates. To tackle this challenge, we develop a neural Survival Analysis model for Fraud
Early detection (SAFE) by combining the recurrent neural network (RNN) with the survival
analysis model. SAFE adopts RNN to handle time-varying covariates as inputs and predicts
the evolving hazard rate given the up-to-date covariates at each timestamp. RNN can capture
the non-linear relations between the hazard rates and time-varying covariates and does not
assume any specific survival time distributions. Moreover, to tackle the challenge due to
the gap between suspended time (reported in training data) and fraudulent activity time
(unavailable in training data), we revise the loss function of the regular survival model. In
particular, SAFE is trained to intentionally increase the hazard rates of fraudsters before
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they are suspended and decrease the hazard rates of normal users.
The contributions of this work are as follows. First, it is the first work to adopt survival analysis for fraud detection. Different from classification models, our approach achieves
consistent predictions along the time. Second, our revised survival model is designed for the
training data with late response labels and can achieve fraud early detection. Third, instead
of assuming any particular survival time distributions, we propose the use of RNN to learn
the hazard rates of users from user activities along time and do not assume any specific
distribution. Fourth, we conduct evaluations over two real-world datasets and our model
outperform state-of-the-art fraud detection approaches. Note that, this chapter is originally
from the published work [84]

5.2

Survival Analysis
Survival analysis models the time until an event of interest occurs. Compared with

the common regression models, in a survival analysis experiment, we may not always be
able to observe event occurrence from start to end due to missing observation or a limited
observation window size. For example, in health data analysis, the time of death can be
missing in some patient records. Such phenomenon is called censoring. In this work, we
focus on two types of censoring: 1) an uncensored sample indicates the event is observed; 2)
a right censored sample indicates the event is not observed in the observation window but
we know it will occur later.
Survival time T is a continuous random variable representing the waiting time until
the occurrence of an event, with the probability density function f (t) = limdt→0
Rt
and the cumulative distribution function F (t) = P (T < t) = 0 f (x)dx.

P {t≤T <t+dt}
dt

The survival function S(t) indicates the probability of the event having not occurred

56

by time t:
Z

∞

S(t) = P (T ≥ t) = 1 − F (t) =

f (x)dx.

(5.1)

t

The hazard function λ(t) refers to the instantaneous rate of occurrence of the event
at time t given that the event does not occur before time t:

P {t ≤ T < t + dt|T ≥ t}
f (t)
=
.
dt→0
dt
S (t)

λ(t) = lim

(5.2)

Additionally, S(t) is associated with λ(t) by

S(t) = e−

Rt
0

λ(x)dx

.

(5.3)

Discrete time. In many cases, the observation time is discrete (seconds, minutes or days).
When T is a discrete variable, we denote t a timestamp index and have the discrete expression:

St = P {T ≥ t} =

∞
X

fk ,

(5.4)

k=t

λt = P {T = t|T ≥ t} =
St = e−

Pt

k=1

λk

.

ft
,
St

(5.5)
(5.6)

Likelihood function. Given a training dataset with N samples where each sample i has
an aggregated covariate xi , a last-observed time ti , and an event indicator ci , the survival
model adopts maximum likelihood to estimate the hazard rate and the corresponding survival
probability. If a sample i has the event (ci = 1), the likelihood function seeks to make the
predicted time-to-event equal to the true event time ti , i.e., maximizing P {T = ti }; if a
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sample i is censored (ci = 0), the likelihood function aims to make the sample survive over
the last-observed time ti , i.e., maximizing P {T ≥ ti }. The joint likelihood function for a
sample i is:
i

i

i

i

P {T = ti }c · P {T ≥ ti }1−c = f (ti )c S(ti )1−c .

(5.7)

The negative log-likelihood function for a sample i can be written as:

`ir = −[ci ln(P {T = ti }) + (1 − ci ) ln(P {T ≥ ti })]
(5.8)

i

=

t
X

i



λti

λt − c · ln(e

− 1),

t=1

where λt = λ(t|xit ; θ) is the conditional hazard rate given covariate x with parameters θ.
The overall loss function over the whole training data is:

Lr =

N
X
i=1

i

`ir

=

t
N h X
X
i=1


i
λt − ci · ln eλti − 1 .

(5.9)

t=1

The survival analysis models learn the relationship between the covariate xi and the survival
probability S(t) by optimizing parameters θ to estimate λt .

5.3

SAFE: A Neural Survival Analysis Model for Fraud Early Detection
In the fraud detection scenario, event of interest refers to users being suspended by

platforms; then, survival time corresponds to the length of time that a user is active. Hence,
users who are suspended in the observation window are event samples; users who are not
suspended are right-censored samples.
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5.3.1

Problem Statement
i
i
i
i
Let D = {(xi , ci , ti )}N
i=1 denote a set of training triplets, where x = (x1 , x2 , · · · , xti )

indicates the sequence data of user i; ci indicates whether the user i is suspended (ci = 1)
or un-suspended (ci = 0) in the observation window; ti denotes the time when the user i is
suspended by the platform or the last-observed time for an un-suspended user; N denotes
the size of the dataset. We consider the problem of detecting fraudsters in a timely manner.
Because ti is the suspended time by the platform instead of the time of committing malicious
activities, we require the detected time earlier than the suspended time ti . The goal of learning
is to train a mapping function between time-varying covariates and the survival probabilities,
i.e., St = f (xit ). The learned mapping function can be deployed to predict whether a new
user is a fraudster at time t based on his activities by comparing the survival probability St
with a threshold τ .

Figure 5.2: An RNN-based survival analysis model for fraud early detection

5.3.2

Model Description
Figure 5.2 describes the basic framework of SAFE. RNN is taken to handle the time-

varying covariates and its outputs are hazard rates along time. At timestamp t, RNN maintains a hidden state vector ht ∈ Rh to keep track of users’ sequence information from the
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current input xt and all of the previous inputs xk , s.t. k < t.
In this work, we adopt the gated recurrent unit (GRU) [70], a variant of the traditional
RNN, to model the long-term dependency of time-varying covariates. With xt and ht−1 , the
hidden state ht is computed by

ht = GRU (xt , ht−1 ).

(5.10)

As shown in Figure 5.2, at time t, hazard rate λt , which indicates the instantaneous
rate of a user should be suspended given that the user is still alive at time t, is derived from
ht by
λt = sof tplus(wλ ht ) = ln(1 + exp(wλ ht )),

(5.11)

where softplus(·) is deployed to guarantee that hazard rate λ is always positive, and wλ is
the weight vector of RNN output layer. Note that the softplus function can be replaced by
other non-linear functions with positive outputs.
Based on Equation 5.6, the survival probability, which indicates the probability of
a user having not been suspended until time t, can be calculates as S(t) = e−

Pt

k=1

λ(k)

. By

comparing the survival probability with a threshold τ , we can predict whether a user should
be suspended at time t. The survival probability S(t) is monotonically decreasing along time,
hence we can achieve consistent predictions.
For outputs, unlike previous works [47, 46], we do not assume hazard rate λ follows
one certain parametric distribution, such as Weibull or Poisson, because, in context of fraud
early detection, we do not know whether λ follows one particular distribution. Instead, SAFE
directly outputs λ which actually follows a general distribution potentially captured by RNN.
We conduct experiments to compare two designs and evaluation results demonstrate SAFE
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outperforms the design with specific parametric distributions.
Loss function. The loss function shown in Equation 5.9 for traditional survival analysis
cannot be used for learning fraud detection model over the training data with late response
labels. In our fraud detection scenario, we aim to detect fraudsters as early as possible while
let censored users survive over the last-observed time. However, Equation 5.9 can let censored
users pass over the last-observed time but cannot detect fraudsters as early as possible.
Aiming to fraud early detection, a simple but non-trivial adaption is performed on
Equation 5.9 to obtain our early-detection-oriented likelihood function, i.e. Equation 5.12.
For simplicity, first, we take user i as an example to give the expression of likelihood and
loss function, and then show the overall loss function for the whole dataset.

i

P {T < ti }c · P {T ≥ ti }1−c

i

ci
i
= F (ti ) · S(ti )1−c
(5.12)
= 1−e

−

Pti

= e

t=1

Pti

ci
t=1 λt

λt

−

· e

Pti

1−ci
t=1 λt

Pti
ci
− 1 · e− t=1 λt .

Compared with the likelihood function of a regular survival model shown in Equation
i

i

5.7, Equation 5.12 changes P {T = ti }c to P {T < ti }c . After this adaption, intuitively, we
can realize that it does match the fraud early detection: with user i being a fraudster (ci = 1),
all of hazard rates before ti will naturally increase as maximizing the term P {T < ti }.
Taking the negative logarithm, we could get loss function of user i:
i

`i =

t
X

Pti

λt − ci · ln(e t=1 λt − 1).

(5.13)

t=1
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Then, given a set of training samples with N users, the overall loss function is defined
as:
L=

N
X

i

i

` =

i=1

N h X
t
X
i=1

Pti

i



λt − c · ln e

t=1

λt

i
−1 .

(5.14)

t=1

Next we illustrate why SAFE is appropriate for fraud early detection. We denote the
model trained by the original loss function Lr (shown in Equation 5.9) as SAFE-r. For
simplicity, instead of two overall loss functions, our following discussions focus on `ir and `i .
The first partial derivatives of `ir and `i w.r.t λ are listed as follows:

∂`ir
∂λt

=



 1

0 < t < ti
(5.15)


 1 − ci ·

eλt
eλt −1

t=t

i

Pti

∂`i
e k=1 λk
= 1 − ci · P t i
∂λt
e k=1 λk − 1
For a fraudster i (ci = 1), we can see

∂`ir
∂λt

0 < t ≤ ti .

(5.16)

= 1 > 0, (0 < t < ti ). It means `ir is an

increasing function w.r.t λ so that λt (0 < t < ti ) is decreasing as minimizing `ir . Moreover, in
accordance with Equation 5.6, survival probability St is increasing with the decrement of λt ,
which means survival probability St is increasing with the minimization of `ir . That is, instead
of detecting the fraudster i before ti , SAFE-r tends to make the fraudster i survive over ti .
On the contrary, for SAFE, we can observe that

∂`i
∂λt

i

= 1−c ·

Pti
k=1 λk
Pti
λ
e k=1 k −1

e

= 1−

Pti
k=1 λk
Pti
λ
e k=1 k −1

e

< 0.

It means `i is a decreasing function w.r.t λ so that λt (0 < t < ti ) is increasing as minimizing
`i . Similarly, we can achieve that survival probability St is decreasing with `i minimized,
which implies that SAFE does have a tendency to detect fraudster i before the suspended
time ti .
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For a censored user j (cj = 0), we obtain

∂`jr
∂λt

=

∂`j
∂λt

= 1. Both `jr and `j are increasing

functions w.r.t λ. As minimizing `jr or `j , λt is becoming smaller. SAFE and SAFE-r both
have a tendency to make censored user j survive over the last-observed time tj .
The above theoretical analysis shows why SAFE can achieve the fraud early detection better than SAFE-r. Experimental results in the experiment section also validate this
theoretical analysis.

5.4

Experiments

5.4.1

Experimental Settings

Datasets. We conduct our experiments on two real-world datasets:
• Twitter . For data preprocessing, we first select suspended users who have the observed
timestamps ranging from 12 to 21 and randomly choose the censored users to compose
a balanced dataset. To this end, twitter consists of 2770 fraudsters and 2770 normal
users. We take the change values of five features between two consecutive timestamps
as inputs to RNN. Fig.5.4.1 details the components of twitter involving numbers of
event-censored users at different last-observed timestamps.
• Wikipedia. We also leverage some data preprocessing on Wikipedia and then derive a
processed dataset called wiki via collecting eight features at each edit for each user: 1)
whether the user edits a Wikipedia meta-page, 2) whether the category of the edit page
is an empty set, 3) whether the consecutive re-edit is less than one minute, 4) whether
the consecutive re-edit is less than three minutes, 5) whether the consecutive re-edit
is less than fifteen minutes, 6) whether the current edit page has been edited before,
7) whether the user edits the same page consecutively, and 8) whether the consecutive
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re-edit pages have the common category. Fig.5.4.1 illustrates the components of wiki
involving event-censor numbers at different last-observed timestamps. Different from
twitter where the censored users are in the last timestamp, there are censored users at
each timestamp on wiki.
Baselines. We compare SAFE with the following baselines:
• SVM is a classical classifier. Given a user time-varying covariate, we average the sequence of each covariate as input to train the SVM and predict the user types (fraudsters or normal users) at each timestamp at the testing phase.
• CPH (Cox proportional hazard model) is a classical survival regression model [45].
Similar to SVM, we adopt the average covariates of users as input to train CPH and
conduct fraud early detection with the first k timestamps. We adopt Lifelines to implement the CPH model.
• M-LSTM (Multi-source LSTM) is a classification-based fraud early detection model
that adopts LSTM to capture the information of time-varying covariates and dynamically predict the user type at each timestamp based on the logistic regression classifier
[12].
Hyperparameters. SAFE is trained by back-propagation via Adam [85] with a batch size
of 16 and a learning rate 10−3 . The dimension of the GRU hidden unit is 32. We randomly
divide the dataset into a training set, a validation set, and a testing set with the ratio (7:1:2).
The threshold τ for fraud early detection is set based on the performance on the validation
set. We run our approach and all baselines for 10 times and report the mean and standard
deviation of each metric. For all the baselines, we use the default parameters provided by
the public packages.
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(a) Twitter

(b) Wiki

Figure 5.3: The distributions of event and right-censored users over the timestamps on
twitter and wiki datasets
Evaluation Metrics. We use Precision, Recall, F1 and Accuracy to evaluate the fraud
early detection performance of various models given the first K-timestamps. For instance,
Accuracy@k (k=1,2,3,4,5 ) indicates the accuracy given the first K-timestamp inputs. We
further report the “percentage of early detected fraudsters” to show the portion of correctly
early detected fraudsters and the “early detected timestamps” to show the number of earlydetected timestamps of fraudsters. Repeatability. Our software together with the datasets
are available at https://github.com/PanpanZheng/SAFE.
Table 5.1: The average performance of fraud early detection on the twitter and wiki datasets
given the first 5-timestamps
Dataset
twitter

wiki

Algorithm
SVM
CPH
M-LSTM
SAFE
SVM
CPH
M-LSTM
SAFE

Precision
0.7370
0.4594
0.6336
0.8198
0.5484
0.5557
0.5255
0.7114

Recall
0.2733
0.7410
0.3521
0.5569
0.6413
0.6206
0.9044
0.8798

F1
0.3875
0.5440
0.4400
0.6537
0.5911
0.5784
0.6556
0.7866

Accuracy
0.5916
0.5453
0.5755
0.7180
0.6754
0.6679
0.5528
0.7640
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Table 5.2: Experimental results (mean±std.) of fraud early detection on the twitter dataset
at the first 5-timestamps
Timestamp
@1

@2

@3

@4

@5

5.4.2

Algorithm
SVM
CPH
M-LSTM
SAFE
SVM
CPH
M-LSTM
SAFE
SVM
CPH
M-LSTM
SAFE
SVM
CPH
M-LSTM
SAFE
SVM
CPH
M-LSTM
SAFE

Precision
0.7500 ± 0.0000
0.1333 ± 0.0000
0.6307 ± 0.1072
0.8312 ± 0.0313
0.7260 ± 0.0000
0.6166 ± 0.0000
0.6291 ± 0.0734
0.8265 ± 0.0297
0.7473 ± 0.0000
0.5309 ± 0.0000
0.6239 ± 0.0479
0.8193 ± 0.0267
0.6463 ± 0.0000
0.5112 ± 0.0000
0.6256 ± 0.0387
0.8136 ± 0.0237
0.8156 ± 0.0000
0.5050 ± 0.0000
0.6591 ± 0.0547
0.8084 ± 0.0424

Recall
0.2050 ± 0.0000
0.0035 ± 0.0000
0.2350 ± 0.1174
0.3731 ± 0.0987
0.1906 ± 0.0000
0.7971 ± 0.0000
0.2952 ± 0.0500
0.5206 ± 0.0564
0.2553 ± 0.0000
0.9389 ± 0.0000
0.3579 ± 0.0458
0.6016 ± 0.0260
0.1906 ± 0.0000
0.9820 ± 0.0000
0.3988 ± 0.0600
0.6330 ± 0.0322
0.5251 ± 0.0000
0.9838 ± 0.0000
0.4739 ± 0.0793
0.6564 ± 0.0337

F1
0.3220 ± 0.0000
0.0069 ± 0.0000
0.3211 ± 0.1374
0.5053 ± 0.0870
0.3019 ± 0.0000
0.6953 ± 0.0000
0.3962 ± 0.0424
0.6360 ± 0.0362
0.3806 ± 0.0000
0.6783 ± 0.0000
0.4515 ± 0.0360
0.6929 ± 0.0133
0.2944 ± 0.0000
0.6724 ± 0.0000
0.4837 ± 0.0435
0.7111 ± 0.0168
0.6389 ± 0.0000
0.6674 ± 0.0000
0.5477 ± 0.0583
0.7235 ± 0.0160

Accuracy
0.5683 ± 0.0000
0.4901 ± 0.0000
0.5483 ± 0.0331
0.6495 ± 0.0309
0.5593 ± 0.0000
0.6508 ± 0.0000
0.5584 ± 0.0300
0.7070 ± 0.0154
0.5845 ± 0.0000
0.5547 ± 0.0000
0.5720 ± 0.0223
0.7361 ± 0.0089
0.5431 ± 0.0000
0.5215 ± 0.0000
0.5822 ± 0.0200
0.7456 ± 0.0108
0.7032 ± 0.0000
0.5098 ± 0.0000
0.6167 ± 0.0374
0.7519 ± 0.0107

Experimental Results

5.4.2.1

Fraud early detection.

Table 5.1 shows the average of metrics of SAFE and baselines for fraud early detection
on twitter and wiki from @1 to @5. It is easily observed that SAFE significantly outperforms
three baselines: on twitter, accuracies and F1 scores of three baselines are all under 0.60
and 0.55, respectively, especially for CPH with accuracy 0.5453 and SVM with F1 0.3875,
while SAFE obtains the acceptable accuracy 0.7180 and F1 0.6537; although three baselines
improve their performance on wiki, especially for SVM with accuracy 0.6754 and M-LSTM
with F1 0.6556, however, SAFE is still far superior to them and achieves satisfiable accuracy
0.7640 and F1 0.7866. Noticeably, although CPH and M-LSTM achieve the best recall on
twitter and wiki (0.7410 and 0.9044), however, they sacrifice their precisions with only 0.4594
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and 0.5255 respectively, which indicate very high false positive rates; on the contrary, SAFE
performs well on holding the balance between precision and recall such that it achieves
precision 0.8198 and recall 0.5569 on twitter and precision 0.7114 and recall 0.8798 on wiki.
The reason why SAFE performs better than three baselines in early detection is
owed to its early-detection-oriented loss function shown in Equation 5.14. Meanwhile, it also
indicates that classification and typical survival models are not appropriate to early detection
because their internal mechanisms do not support early detection.
Table 5.2 shows the comparison results performed on twitter. In accordance with Table
5.2, generally speaking, the F1 and accuracy of SAFE and three baselines increase from @1
to @5. That is, whether for SAFE or three baselines, there is actually some improvement,
more or less, in the performance of early detection as timestamp extends. Furthermore, we
can also see SAFE performs significantly better than three baselines: at @1, accuracies of
three baselines are all under 0.57, especially CPH with 0.49, which to some extent equals
to random guess, while SAFE obtains an acceptable accuracy 0.6464 underlying a tracking
sequence with a minimum length 12; until @5, SAFE’s accuracy reaches 0.7519 while, except
for SVM, Cox and M-LSTM have only 0.5098 and 0.6167, respectively. Noticeably, it seems
to be abnormal for CPH’s recall trend that it starts with 0.0035, then reaches 0.7971, and
ends up with 0.9838. Although its recall is big enough, however, it has a random-guess
precision around 0.5 which is not acceptable. Moreover, the reason why CPH’s recall trend
is so weird, we suspect, it is related to that, at least in first five timestamps, the hazards
provided by time-series CPH are extremely uneven so that an appropriate survival threshold
is unavailable to balance well between recall and precision expected in early detection.
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(a) Percentage of early detected fraudsters

(b) Early detected timestamps of fraudsters

Figure 5.4: Comparison of SAFE and M-LSTM for fraud early detection on the twitter
dataset
5.4.2.2

SAFE vs M-LSTM.

To show the advantage of survival analysis model, we further take a fine-grained comparison between SAFE and M-LSTM for fraud early detection. M-LSTM is a classificationbased model, which adopts LSTM to handle time-varying covariates. SAFE and M-LSTM
have the similar neural network structure but are trained by different objective functions. In
this study, we separate all the fraudsters on twitter into different groups by their suspended
timestamps, e.g., “T12” indicates the the group of fraudsters that are suspended at the 12-th
timestamp. Figure 5.4.2.1 shows the percentages of early detected fraudsters for each group
by SAFE and M-LSTM. We can clearly observe that, compared with M-LSTM, SAFE has
a stronger early detection capability with more early-detected fraudsters in each group. For
example, at the 12-th suspended timestamp, 92% of fraudsters are early-detected by SAFE
while only 54% of fraudsters are early-detected by M-LSTM. Overall, for twitter, 82% of
fraudsters can be correctly early-detected by SAFE, while only 24% of fraudsters can be
early-detected by M-LSTM.
Figure 5.4.2.1 shows the number of early-detected timestamps of fraudsters for each
group on twitter. We can observe that the early-detected timestamps of SAFE are still larger
than those of M-LSTM in most cases. For example, for group “T12”, SAFE can detect
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fraudsters with 9 timestamps ahead of the true suspended time while the early-detected
timestamp of M-LSTM is 5.3. For twitter, the average early-detected timestamp of SAFE
is 11.1, while the average early-detected timestamp of M-LSTM is 9.6. Consequently, in
terms of both the percentage of early-detected fraudsters and the number of early-detected
timestamps, we can see SAFE obviously outperforms M-LSTM in the fraud early detection
scenario.

5.4.3

Model Analysis

(a) F1

(b) Accuracy

Figure 5.5: Comparison of SAFE and SAFE-r for fraud early detection on the twitter
dataset.

5.4.3.1

SAFE vs. SAFE-r.

To show the advantage of the early-detection-oriented loss function, we compare
SAFE with SAFE-r that adopts regular loss function of survival analysis. Figures 5.4.3
and 5.4.3 show the variation of F1 and accuracy along the timestamps on twitter. Generally
speaking, as the timestamp extends, the F1 and accuracy of SAFE and SAFE-r both increase, so their early detection performance roughly gets better. Nevertheless, we see SAFE
is obviously superior to SAFE-r: from T1 to T5, the curves of SAFE for F1 and accuracy are
significantly above the one of SAFE-r. Concretely, SAFE’s accuracy reaches over 0.75 while
SAFE-r just has 0.60 at T5. The reason behind this performance difference is associated
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with their loss functions. For SAFE-r, there is no internal mechanism to support it for early
detection and its small performance improvement, such as accuracy from 0.57 to 0.60, is
mainly due to information accumulation between steps provided by RNN; however, based on
the modification of survival analysis, SAFE has its internal mechanism for early detection.
Table 5.3: The average performance of neural survival model for fraud early detection on the
twitter dataset with and without assuming prior distributions given the first 5-timestamps
Algorithm
Rayleigh-RNN
Poisson-RNN
Exponential-RNN
Weibull-RNN
SAFE

5.4.3.2

Precision
0.5333
0.4857
0.7824
0.7381
0.8198

Recall
0.0012
0.0012
0.0589
0.2865
0.5569

F1
0.0025
0.0024
0.1044
0.3850
0.6537

Accuracy
0.5051
0.5051
0.5267
0.5920
0.7180

SAFE vs. Specific Distributions.

One advantage of SAFE is that SAFE does not assume any specific distributions. We
further evaluate the performance of the neural survival model with and without assuming
any specific distributions. In this experiment, we train RNN to predict the parameters of a
particular distribution instead of hazard rate given time-varying covariates. We adopt three
common distributions for modeling the survival time, i.e., Rayleigh, Poisson, Exponential
and Weibull distributions. Table 5.3 shows the average performance of fraud early detection
on twitter given the timestamps from 1 to 5. We can observe that SAFE, which does not
assume any survival time distribution, significantly outperforms the other approaches by at
least 10% in terms of accuracy and 25% in terms of F1. The experimental results indicate
that SAFE, a model without assuming any specific distribution, is more appropriate to fraud
early detection.
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5.5

Summary
In this chapter, we have developed SAFE that combines survival analysis and RNN

for fraud early detection. Experimental results on two real world datasets demonstrate that
SAFE outperforms classification-based models, the typical survival model, and RNN-based
survival models with specific distributions.
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6

Insider Threat Detection via Hierarchical Neural Temporal Point Processes

Problem Statement: How do we develop a multi-scale fraud detection method via involving
activity physical time and type?
In this chapter, we first take a brief review of the problem background, then define
the problem and deliver the proposed method. The two datasets, CRET and Wikipedia, will
be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed method.

6.1

Introduction
We study how to develop a detection model that captures both activity time and

type information. In literature, the marked temporal point process (MTPP) is a general
mathematical framework to model the event time and type information of a sequence. It has
been widely used for predicting the earthquakes and aftershocks [56]. The traditional MTPP
models make assumptions about how the events occur, which may be violated in reality.
Recently, researchers [42, 58] proposed to combine the temporal point process with recurrent
neural networks (RNNs). Since the neural network models do not need to make assumptions
about the data, the RNN-based MTPP models usually achieve better performance than the
traditional MTPP models.
However, one challenge of applying RNN-based temporal point processes in insider
threat detection is it cannot model the time information in multiple time scales. For example,
user activities are often grouped into sessions that are separated by operations like “LogOn”
and “LogOff”. The dynamics of activities within sessions are different from the dynamics of
sessions. To this end, we propose a hierarchical RNN-based temporal point process model
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that is able to capture both the intra-session and inter-session time information.
Our model contains two layers of long short term memory networks (LSTM) [86],
which are variants of the traditional RNN. The lower-level LSTM captures the activity time
and types in the intra-session level, while the upper-level LSTM captures the time length
information in the inter-session level. In particular, we adopt a sequence to sequence model in
the lower-level LSTM, which is trained to predict the next session given the previous session.
The upper-level LSTM takes the first and last hidden states from the encoder of the lowerlevel LSTM as inputs to predict the interval of two sessions and the duration of next session.
By training the proposed hierarchical model with the activity sequences generated by normal
users, the model can predict the activity time and types in the next session by leveraging the
lower-level sequence to sequence model, the time interval between two consecutive sessions
and the session duration time from the upper-level LSTM. In general, we expect our model
trained by normal users can predict the normal session with high accuracy. If there is a
significant difference between the predicted session and the observed session, the observed
session may contain malicious activities from insiders.
Our work makes the following contributions: (1) we develop an insider threat detection
model that uses both activity type and time information; (2) we propose a hierarchical neural
temporal point process model that can effectively capture two time-scale information; (3) the
experiments on two datasets demonstrate that combining the activity type and multi-scale
time information achieves the best performance for insider threat detection. Note that, this
chapter is originally from the published work [87]
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6.2

Marked Temporal Point Process
Marked temporal point process is to model the observed random event patterns

along time. A typical temporal point process is represented as an event sequence S =
{e1 , · · · , ej , · · · , eT }. Each event ej = (tj , aj ) is associated with an activity type aj ∈ A =
{1, · · · , A} and an occurred time tj ∈ [0, T ]. Let f ∗ ((tj , aj )) = f ((tj , aj )|Htj−1 ) be the conditional density function of the event aj happening at time tj given the history events up
to time tj−1 , where Htj−1 = {(tj 0 , aj 0 )|tj 0 <= tj−1 , aj 0 ∈ A} as the collected historical events
before time tj . Throughout this paper, we use ∗ notation to denote that the function depends
on the history. The joint likelihood of the observed sequence S is:

f

|S| 
{(tj , aj )}j=1

=

|S|
Y

f ((tj , aj )|Htj−1 ) =

j=1

|S|
Y

f ∗ ((tj , aj )).

(6.1)

j=1

There are different forms of f ∗ ((tj , aj )). However, for mathematical simplicity, it usually
assumes the times tj and mark aj are conditionally independent given the history Htj−1 ,
i.e., f ∗ ((tj , aj )) = f ∗ (tj )f ∗ (aj ), where f ∗ (aj ) models the distribution of event types; f ∗ (tj ) is
the conditional density of the event occurring at time tj given the timing sequences of past
events [42].
A temporal point process can be characterized by the conditional intensity function,
which indicates the expected instantaneous rate of future events at time t:

E[N ([t, t + dt])|Htj−1 ]
,
dt→0
dt

λ∗ (t) = λ(t|Htj−1 ) = lim

(6.2)

where N ([t, t + dt]) indicates the number of events occurred in a time interval dt. Given the
conditional density function f and the corresponding cumulative distribution F at time t,
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the intensity function can be also defined as:

λ∗ (t) =

where S(t|Htj−1 ) = exp(−

Rt
tj−1

f (t|Htj−1 )
f (t|Htj−1 )
=
,
S(t|Htj−1 )
1 − F (t|Htj−1 )

(6.3)

λ∗ (τ )dτ ) is the survival function that indicates the probabil-

ity that no new event has ever happened up to time t since tj − 1. Then, the conditional
density function can be described as:

∗

Z



∗

t


λ∗ (τ )dτ .

f (t) = f (t|Htj−1 ) = λ (t)exp −

(6.4)

tj−1

With an observation window [0, T ], the likelihood of the observed event time sequence
T = {t1 , · · · , tn }, s.t. T > tn , is formulated as

L=

Y
ti ∈T

∗

f (ti ) =

Y



∗

Z

λ (ti ) · exp −

T


λ∗ (τ )dτ .

(6.5)

0

ti ∈T

Hawkes process is one category of temporal point processes and it has a distinctive
feature self-excitation: the occurrence likelihood of an upcoming event increases due to the
previous events which just occur. In Hawkes process, the conditional intensity function is
defined as:
λ∗ (t) = λ0 +

X

γ(t, ti ),

(6.6)

ti ∈T

where λ0 > 0 is the base intensity which is independent of the historical events, γ(t, ti ) is
the triggering kernel that is usually a monotonically decreasing function to guarantee recent
events have more influence on the occurrence of the upcoming event. The Hawkes process
models the self-excitation phenomenon that a new event arrival increases the upcoming
event’s conditional intensity which then decreases back towards λ0 gradually. Hawkes process
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is widely used to model the cluster patterns, e.g., the information diffusion on online social
networks or the earthquake occurrences.

6.3

Sequence-to-Sequence Model
In general, a sequence-to-sequence (seq2seq) model is used to convert sequences from

one domain to sequences in another domain. The seq2seq consists of two components, one
encoder and one decoder. Both encoder and decoder are long short-term memory (LSTM)
models and can model the long-term dependency of sequences. The seq2seq model is able to
encode a variable-length input to a fixed-length vector and further decode the vector back
to a variable-length output. The length of the output sequence could be different from that
of the input sequence.
The goal of the seq2seq model is to estimate the P (y1 , · · · , yT 0 |x1 , · · · , xT ), where
(x1 , · · · , xT ) is an input sequence and (y1 , · · · , yT 0 ) is the corresponding output sequence.
The encoder encodes the input sequence to a hidden representation with an LSTM model
en
hen
= LST M en (xj , hen
j
j−1 ) where xj is the up-to-date input, hj−1 is the previous hidden
en
state, and hen
j is the learned current hidden state. The last hidden state hT captures the

information of the whole input sequence. The decoder computes the conditional probability
P (y1 , · · · , yT 0 |x1 , · · · , xT ) by another LSTM model whose initial hidden state is set as hen
T :
0

P (y1 , · · · , yT 0 |x1 , · · · , xT ) =

T
Y

P (yj |hen
T , y1 , · · · , yj−1 ).

(6.7)

j=1

de
de
de
de
In seq2seq model, P (yj |hen
T , y1 , · · · , yj−1 ) = g(hj ), where hj = LST M (yj−1 , hj−1 ) is the

j-th hidden vector of the decoder; g(·) is usually a softmax function.
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Figure 6.1: The framework for sequence generation with two time scales. The lower-level
LSTM captures event patterns with the time and mark pairs in a session. The upper-level
LSTM aims to predict the duration of sessions and inter-sessions.
6.4
6.4.1

Insider Threat Detection
Framework
We model a user’s behavior as a sequence of activities that can be extracted from

various types of raw data, such as user logins, emails, Web browsing, and FTP. Formally,
we model the up-to-date activities of a user as sequence U = {S 1 , · · · S k , · · · } where S k =
{ek1 , · · · , ekj , · · · , ekTk } indicates his k-th activity session. For example, each session in our
scenario is a sequence of activities starting with “LogOn” and ending with “LogOff”. ekj =
(tkj , akj ) denotes the j-th activity in the user’s k-th session and contains activity type akj and
occurred time tkj . We define dkj = tkj − tkj−1 as the inter-activity duration between activities
akj and akj−1 , dk = tkTk − tk1 as the length time of the k-th session, and ∆k = tk1 − tTk−1
as the
k−1
time interval between the (k − 1)-th and k-th sessions. Note that tTk−1
is the occurred time
k−1
of the last activity in the (k − 1)-th session.
The goal of learning in our threat detection is to predict whether a new session
S k = {ek1 , · · · , ekj , · · · , ekTk } is normal or fraudulent. To address the challenge that there are
often no or very few records of known insider attacks for training our model, we propose a
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generative model that models normal user behaviors from a training dataset consisting of only
sequences of normal users. The learned model is then used to calculate the fraudulent score
of the new session S k . We quantify the fraudulence of S k from two perspectives, activity
information (including both type and time) within sessions, and session time information
(i.e., when a session starts and ends). For example, a user who foresees his potential layoff
may have activities of uploading documents to Dropbox and visiting job-searching websites
although he may try to hide these abnormal activities in multiple sessions; he may have
“LogOn” and “LogOff” times different from his normal sessions as he may become less
punctual or may have more sessions during weekends or nights, resulting different session
durations and intervals between sessions. Moreover, when a user’s account is compromised,
activity and session information from the attacker will also be different even if the attacker
tries to mimic the normal user’s behaviors.
We develop a unified hierarchical model capable of capturing a general nonlinear
dependency over the history of all activities. Our detection model does not rely on any predefined signatures and instead use deep learning models to capture user behaviors reflected
in raw data. Specifically, our hierarchical model learns the user behaviors in two time scales,
intra-session level and inter-session level. For the intra-session level, we adopt the seq2seq
model to predict Ŝ k based on the previous S k−1 and use the marked temporal point process
model to capture the dynamic difference of activities. Note that the number of activities of
the predicted session Ŝ k could be different from that of the previous S k−1 as well as the true
S k . For the inter-session level, we aim to model the session interval ∆k = tk1 − tk−1
Tk−1 and the
session duration dk = tkTk − tk1 of the k-th session.
The whole framework of predicting future events with two time scales is shown in
Figure 6.1. We do not assume any specific parametric form of the conditional intensity
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function. Instead, we follow [42] to seek to learn a general representation to approximate the
unknown dependency structure over the history. We also emphasize that the neural temporal
point processes of two levels are connected in our framework. The upper-level LSTM takes the
first and last hidden states from the encoder of the lower-level LSTM as inputs to predict the
interval of two sessions and the session duration. This connection guarantees the upper-level
LSTM incorporates activity type information in its modeling. For insider threat detection,
since our model is trained by benign sessions, the predicted session Ŝ k would be close to the
observed S k when S k is normal, and different from S k when S k is abnormal. In Session 6.4.4,
ˆ k ) with
we will present details about how to derive fraudulent score by comparing (Ŝ k , dˆk , ∆
(S k , dk , ∆k ), where •ˆ indicates the predicted value.

6.4.2

Intra-Session Insider Threat Detection
In this work, we propose to use the seq2seq model to estimate the joint likelihood of

k-th session given the (k − 1)-th session. In particular, the encoder of the seq2seq model is to
encode the activity time and type information at (k−1)-th session to a hidden representation.
The decoder is to model the activity time interval dkj+1 and type akj+1 information at k-th
session given the history.
Encoder: To map the (k − 1)-th session to a hidden representation, the encoder first
enk−1

maps each activity occurring at time tk−1
with type ak−1
to an embedding vector xj
j
j

enk−1

xj

= wt dk−1
+ Wem ajk−1 ,
j

:

(6.8)

t
where dk−1
is the inter-activity duration between ak−1
and ak−1
j
j
j−1 ; w is a time-mapping pa-

rameter; Wem is an activity embedding matrix; ak−1
is a one-hot vector of the activity type
j
ak−1
. Then, by taking the entire sequence of (k − 1)-th session as inputs to the encoder
j
79

en

k−1
.
LSTM, the encoder projects the (k − 1)-th session to a hidden representation hTk−1

Decoder: The decoder is trained to predict the pairs of activity type and time at
the k-th session given the information of (k − 1)-th session. To predict the activity type
k
information, given the hidden state of the decoder hde
j , the probability of the next activity

having type value a can be derived by a softmax function:

P (akj+1

=

k
a|hde
j )

k
exp(was hde
j )

= PA

a0 =1

k
exp(was 0 hde
j )

,

(6.9)

where was is the a-th row of the weight matrix Ws in the softmax function.
To predict the activity time information, we adopt the conditional density function
defined in Equation 6.4. First, inspired by [42], we derive the LSTM-based conditional intensity function λ∗ (t) as:

k
λ∗ (t) = exp(vhde
+ ut (t − tkj ) + b),
j

(6.10)

where the exponential function is deployed to ensure the intensity function is always positive;
v is a weight vector; ut and b are scalars. Then, we can derive the conditional density function
given the history until time tkj :
Z t
f (t) = λ (t)( λ∗ (τ )dτ )
∗

∗

tkj

1
k
k
= exp vt hde
+ ut (t − tkj ) + bt + exp(vt hde
j
j
u

1
k
+ bt ) − exp(vt hde
+ ut (t − tkj ) + bt ) .
j
u

(6.11)

Hence, given the observed activity time information, we can calculate the conditional
density function of the time interval between two consecutive activities dkj+1 = tkj+1 − tkj at
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k-th session:
k
f ∗ (dkj+1 ) = f (dkj+1 |hde
j ).

(6.12)

Since the lower-level LSTM is to model the time interval dkj+1 and type akj+1 information, given a collection of activity sessions from benign employees, we combine the likelihood
functions of the event type (Equation 6.9) and time (Equation 6.12) to have the negative
joint log-likelihood of the observation sessions:

La = −

Tk 
M X
X

k
log P (akj+1 |hde
j )

+ log f

∗



(dkj+1 )

,

(6.13)

k=1 j=1

where M is the total number of sessions in the training dataset; Tk is the number of activities
in a session. The lower-level LSTM along with the decoder LSTM is trained by minimizing
the negative log-likelihood shown in Equation 6.13.
When the model is deployed for detection, to obtain the predicted activity type âkj+1 ,
k
we simply choose the type with the largest probability P (a|hde
j ) (calculated by Equation

6.9):
k
âkj+1 = argmax P (a|hde
j ).

(6.14)

a∈A

We further calculate the expected inter-activity duration between (j+1)-th and j-th activities
dˆkj+1 = E(tkj ):

dˆkj+1 =

Z

∞

tf ∗ (t)dt.

(6.15)

tkj

The difference between dˆkj+1 and the observed dkj+1 will be used to calculate the fraudulent
score in terms of the timing information of intra-session activities.
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6.4.3

Inter-Session Insider Threat Detection
The inter-session duration is crucial for insider threat detection. To capture such

information, we further incorporate an upper-level LSTM into the framework, which focuses
on modeling the inter-session behaviors of employees. Specifically, the upper-level LSTM is
trained to predict the inter-session duration between k-th and (k − 1)-th sessions (∆k =
k
k
k
tk1 − tk−1
Tk−1 ) and the k-th session duration (d = tTk − t1 ).

To predict the inter-session duration ∆k , the input of the upper-level LSTM is from
en

k−1
of (k − 1)-th session from the lower-level LSTM as shown in
the last hidden state hTk−1

Equation 6.16, while to predict the k-th session duration dk , the input of the upper-level
k
of k-th session as shown in Equation 6.17.
LSTM is from the first hidden state hen
1

en

k−1
xk−1
Tk−1 = UhTk−1 ,
k
xk1 = Uhen
1 ,

(6.16)
(6.17)

where U is an input weight matrix for the upper-level LSTM.
k
Then, we can get the hidden states (hk−1
Tk−1 and h1 ) of the upper-level sequence based

on an LSTM model. Finally, the conditional density functions of the inter-session duration
∆k and session duration dk are:

fs∗ (∆k ) = f (∆k |hk−1
Tk−1 ),
fs∗ (dk ) = f (dk |hk1 ),

(6.18)
(6.19)

where fs∗ (∆k ) and fs∗ (dk ) can be calculated based on Equation 6.11.
To train the upper-level LSTM, the negative log-likelihood of inter-session sequences
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can be defined as:
0

Ls = −

M X
Km
X


log fs∗ (∆km ) + log fs∗ (dkm ) ,

(6.20)

m=1 k=1

where M 0 is the total number of inter-session level sequences in the training dataset; K
indicates the number of sessions in an inter-session level sequence. In our experiments, we
use the upper-level LSTM to model the employee sessions in a week. Then, M 0 indicates the
total number of weeks in the training dataset, and K is the number of sessions in a week. The
upper-level LSTM is trained by minimizing the negative log-likelihood shown in Equation
6.20. After training, the upper-level LSTM can capture the patterns of the inter-session
duration and session duration.
When the model is deployed for detection, we calculate the predicted inter-session
ˆ k and the k-th session duration dˆk , shown
duration between k-th and (k − 1)-th sessions ∆
in Equations 6.21.
ˆk

Z

∞

∆ =
tk−1
T

tfs∗ (t),

ˆk

Z

∞

d =
tk1

tfs∗ (t)dt.

(6.21)

ˆ k (dˆk ) and the observed ∆k (dk ) will be used to calculate
The difference between ∆
the fraudulent score in terms of the session timing information.

6.4.4

Fraudulent Score
After obtaining the predicted session, we compare the generated times and types in a

session with the observed session, respectively. For the activity types, we adopt the Bilingual
Evaluation Understudy (BLEU) [88] score to evaluate the difference between the observed
session and generated session. The BLEU metric was originally used for evaluating the
similarity between a generated text and a reference text, with values closer to 1 representing
more similar texts. BLEU is derived by counting matching n-grams in the generated text to
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n-grams in the reference text and insensitive to the word order. Hence, BLEU is suitable for
evaluating the generated sequences and the observed sequences. We define the fraudulent
score in terms of intra-session activity type as:

scorea = 1 − BLEU (Sak , Ŝak ),

(6.22)

where Sak indicates the observed activity types in k-th session while Ŝak indicates the predicted
session. If scorea is high, it means the observed session is a potentially malicious session in
terms of session activity types.
For the activity time, as shown in Equation 6.23, we define the fraudulent score in
terms of intra-session activity time by computing the mean absolute error (MAE) of the
predicted time of each activity with the observed occurring time:
|S|

1 X k ˆk
|d − dj |.
scoret =
|S| j=1 j

(6.23)

Since the upper-level LSTM takes each session’s first and last hidden states as inputs
to predict the time lengths of sessions and inter-sessions, we can further derive the time scores
by comparing the predicted time lengths with the observed ones. We define the fraudulent
score in terms of inter-session duration as:

ˆ k − ∆k |.
score∆ = |∆

(6.24)

Similarly, we define the fraudulent score in terms of session duration as:

scored = |dˆk − dk |.

(6.25)
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Note that although dˆk can be derived based on all the predicted activity time from lowerlevel LSTM, the error usually is high due to the accumulated error over the whole sequence.
Hence, we use the upper-level LSTM to get the session time length. Finally, by combining
Equations 6.22, 6.23, 6.24 and 6.25, we define the total fraudulent score (F S) of a session
as:
F S = α1 scorea + α2 scoret + α3 scored + α4 score∆ ,

(6.26)

where α1 , α2 , α3 , α4 are hyper-parameters, which can be set based on the performance of
insider threat detection via using each score alone.

6.5
6.5.1

Experiments
CERT.
We adopt the CERT Insider Threat Dataset [62] for the evaluation. Before that, we

join all the log files, separate them by each employee, and then sort the activities of each
employee based on the recorded timestamps. We randomly select 2000 benign employees
as the training dataset and another 500 employees as the testing dataset. The test dataset
includes all sessions from five insiders. The statistics of the training and testing datasets is
shown in Table 6.1. Based on the activities recorded in the log files, we extract 19 activity
types shown in Table 6.2. The activity types are designed to indicate the malicious activities.
Table 6.1: Statistics of Training and Testing Datasets
#
#
#
#

of
of
of
of

Employees
Sessions
Insiders
Malicious Sessions

Training Dataset
2000
1039805
0
0

Testing Dataset
500
142600
5
68

Baselines. We compare our model with two one-class classifiers: 1) One-class SVM (OCSVM)

85

Table 6.2: Operation Types Recorded in Log Files
Files
logon.csv

email.csv

http.csv

device.csv

file.csv

Operation Types
Weekday Logon (employee logs on a computer on a weekday at work hours)
Afterhour Weekday Logon (employee logs on in a weekday after work hours)
Weekend Logon (employees logs on at weekends)
Logoff (employee logs off a computer)
Send Internal Email (employee sends an internal email)
Send External Email (employee sends an external email)
View Internal Email (employee views an internal email)
View external Email (employee views an external email)
WWW Visit (employee visits a website)
WWW Download (employee downloads files from a website)
WWW Upload (employee uploads files to a website)
Device Connect (employee connects a device at weekday working hours)
After-hour Device Connect (employee connects a device in weekday after-hours)
Weekend Device Connect (employee connects a device at weekends)
Disconnect Device (employee disconnects a device)
Open doc/jpg/txt/zip File (employee opens a doc/jpg/txt/zip file)
Copy doc/jpg/txt/zip File (employee copies a doc/jpg/txt/zip file)
Write doc/jpg/txt/zip File (employee writes a doc/jpg/txt/zip file)
Delete doc/jpg/txt/zip File (employee deletes a doc/jpg/txt/zip file)

[25] adopts support vector machine to learn a decision hypersphere around the positive data,
and considers samples located outside this hypersphere as anomalies; 2) Isolation Forest
(iForest) [89] detects the anomalies with short average path lengths on a set of trees. For
both baselines, we consider each activity type as an input feature and the feature value is the
number of activities of the corresponding type in a session. In this paper, we do not compare
with other RNN based insider threat detection methods (e.g., [21]) as these methods were
designed to detect the insiders or predict the days that contain insider threat activities.
Hyperparameters. We map the extracted activity types to the type embeddings. The
dimension of the type embeddings is 50. The dimension of the LSTM models is 100. We
adopt Adam [85] as the stochastic optimization method to update the parameters of the
framework. When training the upper-level LSTM by Equation 6.20, we fix the parameters
in the lower-level LSTM and only update the parameters in the upper-level LSTM.
Experiment Results. We aim to detect all the 68 malicious sessions from the totally
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Figure 6.2: ROC curve of malicious session detection using various fraudulent scores

Figure 6.3: ROC curve of malicious session detection using various approaches
142,600 sessions in the testing set. Figure 6.2 shows the receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curves of our model for insider threat detection by leveraging various fraudulent
scores. By using each fraudulent score separately, we can notice that the scorea derived from
intra-session activity types achieves the highest area under cure (AUC) score, which indicates
the activity types of malicious sessions are different from the normal sessions. Meanwhile, the
session duration time and inter-session duration time also make positive contributions to the
malicious session detection. The scored derived from the session duration time and score∆
derived from the inter-session duration time achieve good performance with AUC=0.6851
and 0.7073, respectively, which indicates the duration of malicious sessions and inter-sessions
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are usually different from those of normal sessions. We also notice that the scoret based on
the inter-activity activity time information does not help much on insider threat detection.
The AUC derived from scoret is 0.3021. After examining the data, we find that there is no
much difference in terms of inter-activity time information between malicious sessions and
normal sessions. Since adopting scoret does not achieve reasonable performance in the CERT
Insider Threat dataset, we set α2 = 0 when deriving the total insider threat detection F S. As
a result, our detection model using the total insider threat detection F S, which combines all
the intra- and inter-session information, achieves the best performance with the AUC=0.9033
when the hyper-parameters in Equation 6.26 are α1 = 1, α2 = 0, α3 = 1, α4 = 1.
Figure 6.3 further shows the ROC curves of our model and two baselines. We can
observe that our model achieves better performance than baselines in terms of AUC score.
Especially, we can notice that when our model only adopts the activity type information
(scorea ) for malicious session detection, our model is slightly better than baselines in terms of
AUC. With further combining the activity time and type information, our model significantly
outperforms the baselines with the AUC=0.9033.

6.5.2

Wikipedia.
Due to the limitation of the CERT dataset where the inter-activity duration times

are randomly generated, the inter-activity time in the intra-session level does not make
contributions to the insider threat detection. To further show the advantage of incorporating
activity time information, we apply our model for detecting vandals on Wikipedia. Vandals
can be considered as insiders in the community of Wikipedia contributors. The study has
shown that the behaviors of vandals and benign users are different in terms of edit time,
e.g., vandals make faster edits than benign users [11]. Hence, we expect that using the inter-
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activity time information can boost the performance of vandal detection. We adopt half of
the benign users for training and the other half of the benign users and all the vandals for
testing. Since user activities on Wikipedia do not have explicit indicators, such as LogON
or LogOff, to split the user activity sequence into sessions, we consider user activities in a
day as a user session. As a result, the session duration is always 24hrs, and the inter-session
duration is 0. Therefore, in this experiment, we focus on vandalism session detection with
only using information from the intra-session level and adopt the lower-level LSTM shown
in Figure 6.1 accordingly. Note that we filter out all the sessions with number of activities
less than 5. The seq2seq model takes a feature vector as an input and predicts the next edit
time and type. In this experiment, we consider the activity type as whether the current edit
will be reverted or not. The feature vector of the user’s t-th edit is composed by: (1) whether
or not the user edited on a meta-page; (2) whether or not the user consecutively edited the
pages less than 1 minute, 3 minutes, or 5 minutes; (3) whether or not the user’s current edit
page had been edited before.

Figure 6.4: ROC curve of vandalism session detection using various fraudulent scores

Experiment Results. From Figure 6.4, we can observe that only using the inter-activity
time information can achieve surprisingly good performance on vandalism session detection
with AUC=0.9121, which indicates the inter-activity time information is crucial for vandal89

Figure 6.5: ROC curve of vandalism session detection using various approaches
ism session detection. Meanwhile, adopting the activity type information can also achieve
the vandalism session detect with AUC=0.7399. Hence, using inter-activity time information achieves better performance than using the activity type information in terms of AUC.
It also means vandals have significantly different patterns in activity time compared with
benign users. Finally, with combining the activity type and time information, our model can
achieve even better performance with AUC=0.9496.
We further compare our model with two baselines, i.e., One-class SVM and Isolation
Forest. For the baselines, we consider the same features as the seq2seq model and further
combine activity types. The value of each feature is the mean value of the corresponding
feature in a day. Figure 6.5 indicates that our model significantly outperforms baselines in
terms of AUC on the vandalism session detection task. Similar to the results on the CERT
dataset, when our model only adopts the activity type information (scorea shown in Figure
6.4), the model achieves similar performance as baselines. With considering the activity time
information, the performance of our model is improved by a large margin.
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6.6

Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a hierarchical neural temporal point process model

for insider threat detection. Experimental results, which are perfomred on an insider threat
detection dataset and a Wikipedia vandal detection dataset, demonstrate the effectiveness
of our model.
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7

Using Dirichlet Marked Hawkes Processes for Insider Threat Detection

Problem Statement: Could we develop a more flexible framework for dynamic fraud detection?
In this chapter, we first introduce the problem background, then formulate the problem and present the proposed method. The two datasets, CRET and Wikipedia, will be used
to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed method.

7.1

Introduction
Various insider threat detection approaches have been proposed [90, 20, 22, 91, 19,

21, 92]. However, the existing works usually focus on detecting malicious sessions, e.g., a
sequence of activities in a day, and cannot achieve the dynamic malicious activity detection.
In this paper, we aim to develop a detection model that can dynamically detect the malicious
activities. To this end, besides adopting the activity type (e.g., WWW visit, send email)
information, we further consider the crucial activity time information since the time an
activity occurred is also a strong indicator about whether the activity is malicious. For
example, if a user usually does not work after-hours, an activity, say connecting a USB flash
drive, from that user happens at midnight is potentially malicious.
The intuitive idea of detecting malicious insider activities is to model the occurrence
likelihoods of activities in terms of activity type and time. Since the majority of activities
are benign even for the insiders, the likelihoods of benign activities should be high. Hence, if
an activity is occurred with a low likelihood in terms of activity type and time, it could be
a malicious activity. In this work, we adopt the Marked Temporal Point Process (MTPP),
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which is a general mathematical framework, to model the user activities over time. Specifically, we adopt the Hawkes process to model the temporal information of user activities,
while the activity types are captured by a mark model. However, the activity sequence from
a user consists of various temporal patterns that are driven by his working patterns. For
example, if the user is in the work mode, his activities are dense in a short time window,
and the activity types mainly consist of file editing. If the user is in the leisure mode, his
activities would be sparse in a time window, and the activity types may be more about Web
surfing. We call the different working patterns user modes. Hence, only using one marked
Hawkes process model is unable to capture the dynamic user activities under various user
modes. Meanwhile, due to the potential infinite number of user activities, the number of user
modes is also large and unknown. Hence, it is also hard to use a fixed number of marked
Hawkes processes to model the complicated user activities. The effectiveness of modeling the
sequence of activities and the following detecting malicious insider activities depends on how
to capture the unbounded user modes from the observed sequence.
In this paper, we develop the Dirichlet Marked Hawkes Process (DMHP) to detect
malicious insider threats. DMHP adopts the Dirichlet process to determine the prior distribution of user modes. Each mode has its own temporal dynamics in terms of activity type
and time. Hence we adopt one set of marked Hawkes processes to model the sequence of user
activities in each specific mode. For each particular activity in the sequence, we then derive
an occurrence likelihood based on DMHP and use it as an evaluation score for predicting
whether or not the activity is malicious.
Our work makes the following contributions: (1) we develop a dynamic and unsupervised insider threat activity detection model that considers both activity type and time
information; (2) to this end, we propose a Dirichlet Marked Hawkes Process that can ef-
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fectively capture the sequence of user activities with unbounded number of modes; (3) we
conduct experiments on two datasets, the CERT Insider Threat Dataset [62] and the UMDWikipedia dataset [11], and evaluation results demonstrate the effectiveness of our model for
malicious activity detection. We emphasize that insider attacks are subtle and dynamic and
the number of malicious insider activities is only a very small fraction of all activities from
insiders (e.g., 0.01% to 0.3% in CERT data). Detection models based on supervised learning
usually do not work here due to lack of labeled insider activity record. Detection models
based on few-shot learning may not work either as the few known insider attack instances in
training data are often very different from test data. Our DMHP detection model is based
on unsupervised learning, does not assume any labeled attacks record, and can score each
coming activity in a real-time manner.

7.2

Dirichlet Process
The Dirichlet process (DP) is a Bayesian nonparametric model, which is parameter-

ized by a concentration parameter η > 0 and a base distribution G0 over a space Θ. It
indicates that a random distribution G drawn from DP is a distribution over Θ, denoted
as G ∼ DP (η, G0 ). The expectation of the distribution G is the base distribution G0 . The
concentration parameter controls the variance of G, where the higher values of η lead to
tight distributions around G0 . DP is widely used for clustering with the unknown number of
clusters.
Chinese restaurant process (CRP) is one kind of representations for Dirichlet
process. CRP assumes a restaurant with an infinite number of tables, each of which can
seat an infinite number of customers. Within the context of clustering, each table indicates
a cluster while each customer is a data point. The simulation process of CRP is as follows:
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Table 7.1: Summary of the notation
Symbol
(tn , an )
zn
D
K
L
λ0
0
0
(α1 , . . . , αL )
0
0
(θ1 , . . . , θD )
s(tn , an )

φcn

Definition
The n-th activity occurring at time tn with activity type an .
The mode assignment for activity (tn , an ).
The category number of activity types.
The number of modes we have till tn .
The number of triggering kernels for one specific mode.
The base intensity of Hawkes process.
The concentration parameter of Dirichlet prior for Hawkes process.
The concentration parameter of Dirichlet prior for categorical distribution.
The combined score provided by the Dirichlet mode-specific model for (tn , an ).
The insider activity detection threshold.
The weight of particle c at timestamp n.

1. The first customer always sits at the first table.
2. Customer n (n > 1) is distributed to:
(a) a new table with probability

η
.
η+n−1

(b) an existing table z with probability

nz
η+n−1

where nz is the number of customers

at table z.
Let β1 , ..., βn be a sequence sampled from CRP. The conditional distribution of βn can be
written as:
βn |β1:n−1 ∼

X

1
ηG0 +
nz δβz ,
η+n−1
z

(7.1)

where δβz is a point mass centred at βz . According to Eq. 7.1, we can see that the probability to be distributed to a new table is associated with concentration parameter η and the
likelihood of an upcoming sample βn to be allocated to an existing table z is proportional to
the table size nz . In other words, the table with a bigger size has more opportunity to serve
the upcoming customer. Therefore, we can see DP has a clustering property (”The rich gets
richer”) for the online streaming data.
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7.3

Framework
Considering an activity sequence E = {e1 , . . . , en , . . . }, en = (tn , an ) indicates the

activity with type an occurring at time tn , where an ∈ A = {1, . . . , D} and D is the number
of activity types. Our insider threat detection task is to detect anomalous activities that
have different behavior patterns with normal ones. For this task, we develop the Dirichlet
Marked Hawkes Process (DMHP) framework that is an infinite mixture model based on
the Chinese restaurant process (Section 7.2). Our mixture model assumes that, underlying
the activity stream E, there potentially exists a countable-but-unknown number of hidden
clusters Z = {zk }K
k=1 where zk ∈ Z and K, like the number of occupied tables in CRP,
represents the number of hidden clusters. Note that K is dynamically changing along the
activity stream and its value is fixed-but-unknown at one specific moment. In our insider
threat detection scenario, we call these hidden clusters as user modes and use the term
mode throughout the paper. Table 7.1 shows the summary of notations. Our DMHP adopts
the Dirichlet process to determine the prior distribution of user modes. Each mode has its
own temporal dynamics in terms of activity type and time. We adopt one set of marked
Hawkes processes to describe each mode. To some extent, we can take each user mode as one
dimension and all of the existing user modes construct a multi-dimensional space. From this
point of view, in contrast with the hierarchical RNN in Chapter 6, a detection framework with
two dimensions (scales), DMHP is a mode-based multi-scale detection model with unlimited
dimensions. For each activity in the streaming sequence, we calculate a combined likelihood
score based on the current K modes we have at hand and use the score to predict whether
the activity is malicious.

96

7.3.1

Marked Hawkes Process with Prior
In this section, we develop a marked Hawkes process model with Dirichlet priors to

capture both time and type information.
Time. We adopt Hawkes process to model the time information. Given an observed
activity stream (t1 , a1 ), . . . , (tn−1 , an−1 ), for an upcoming activity (tn , an ) with an unknown
mode assignment zn , based on Eq. 6.4, the occurrence likelihood associated with time is
measured by
p(tn |zn , t1:n−1 ) =

λ∗zn (tn )



tn

Z

· exp −


λ∗zn (τ )dτ ,

(7.2)

tn−1

and its intensity value is as follow

λ∗zn (tn ) = λ0 +

X

γzn (tn , ti )1[zi = zn ],

(7.3)

ti <tn

where zi refers to the mode assigned to the i-th activity and γzn (tn , ti ) is the triggering
function of mode zn with the form

γzn (tn , ti ) =

L
X

αzl n · κ(τl , tn − ti ),

(7.4)

l=1

0

0

0

αzn ∼ Dir(α1 , α2 , . . . , αL ),

(7.5)

where κ(·) is the base kernel function, αzn ∈ RL is the weight vector for L different time
0

0

0

0

scale kernels, α = (α1 , α2 , . . . , αL ) ∈ RL are the corresponding hyperparameters of Dirichlet
prior, and τl is the typical reference time points.
Type. We take use of the categorical distribution with a Dirichlet prior to model the
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upcoming activity type an underlying mode zn

p(an |zn , y1:n−1 ) ∼ Cat(θ zn ),

(7.6)

0

(7.7)

0

0

θ zn ∼ Dir(θ1 , θ2 , . . . , θD ),

where θ zn ∈ RD is the parameter vector for categorical distribution with mode zn and
0

0

0

0

θ = (θ1 , θ2 , . . . , θD ) ∈ RD is the corresponding hyperparameters of Dirichlet prior. Then,
based on the historical activity types, by the Dirichlet-Categorical conjugate relation, the
occurrence likelihood associated with type can be concretely represented as
0

C an =d,zn + θan =d
,
p(an = d|zn , y1:n−1 ) =
P
0
C zn + D
i=1 θi

(7.8)

where C an =d,zn is the number of activities with type d in mode zn excluding the current
0

0

activity, θan =d is the d-th element of hyperparameter vector θ that is related to activity
type an , and C zn is the total number of activities in mode zn excluding the current activity.
Time & Type. Given the history of past activities, the conditional density function
that the upcoming activity will happen at time tn with type an can have different forms.
In practice, we typically choose some simple factorized formulation to reduce the excessive
complications caused by jointly and explicitly modeling the time and type information. In
our paper, by Eq.7.2 and 7.8, the joint occurrence likelihood of the upcoming activity (tn , an )
under user mode zn provided by marked Hawkes process is formulated as

p(tn , an |zn , t1:n−1 , a1:n−1 ) = p(an |zn , a1:n−1 ) · p(tn |zn , t1:n−1 ).

(7.9)
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7.3.2

Dirichlet Marked Hawkes Process
Our proposed Dirichlet Marked Hawkes Process (DMHP) model is one mixture model

and consists of a set of marked Hawkes processes with prior. As a non-parametric Bayesian
model, DMHP can be taken as a generative model. Its equivalent generative process for one
user-specific activity stream can be described as follows.
0

0

0

1. Initialize parameters: base intensity λ0 , hyperparameters for Dirichlet priors, (α1 , α2 , . . . , αL )
0

0

0

and (θ1 , θ2 , . . . , θD )
0

0

0

0

0

0

2. Draw α1 from Dir(α1 , α2 , . . . , αL ) and θ1 from Dir(θ1 , θ2 , . . . , θD )
3. Draw t1 from Poisson(λ0 ) and a1 ∼ Cat(θ1 )
4. Assign K ← 1 and z1 ← K
5. For n > 1:
a. Draw time tn > tn−1 for the new activity from Poisson(λ0 +

Pn−1
i=1

γzi (tn , ti ))

b. Draw the mode zn for the new activity

p(zn = k|t1:n ) =





λ∗n =k (tn )
Pzn−1
,
λ0 + i=1 γzi (tn ,ti )

k = 1, · · · , K




λ
Pn−10
,
λ0 + i=1 γzi (tn ,ti )

k =K +1

0

0

(7.10)

0

0

0

0

If zn = K+1, draw αzn from Dir(α1 , α2 , . . . , αL ), draw θ zn from Dir(θ1 , θ2 , . . . , θD ),
K ← K + 1.
c. Draw type for the new activity

an |zn , a1:n−1

X C an =d,zn + θa0 =d
∼
PD n 0 · δd ,
zn +
C
i=1 θi
d

(7.11)
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where δd is a point mass centred at activity type d.
In the above process, K is a mode counter to record the total number of modes we have
until now, k refers to some certain mode, and zn represents the mode assignment of the
n-th activity. In step 5a, we first draw time tn for the new activity by a Poisson process
parameterized by an intensity value that is derived from the historical activities and current
user modes. The generation of the activity timing in the process can be viewed as the
superposition of a Poisson process λ0 and multiple Hawkes processes. In step 5b, we draw
the mode zn for the new activity with the probability mass function (shown in Eq. 7.10) that
is constructed by Eq. 7.3. If it is a new mode, we draw its weight vector αzn for the L time
scale kernels, θ zn to parameterize the categorical distribution and then increase K by one.
In step 5c, we draw type for the new activity with the mass function constructed by Eq. 7.8.

7.3.3

Insider Malicious Activity Detection
In insider threat detection, our goal is to evaluate whether or not the most recently

observed activity (tn , an ) is anomalous on the fly. The above Dirichlet marked Hawkes process
gives a basic idea on how a sequence of samples {(tn , an )} is generated. In particular, we show
in Eq. 7.10 of step 5b how to calculate the probability of mode zn given the time sequence,
i.e., p(zn = k|t1:n ). In step 5c, we further show in Eq. 7.11 how to generate an given mode
zn and the previous type sequence a1:n−1 . This generative process gives us idea on how to
distribute the most recent observed activity (tn , an ) to user modes in a probabilistic way.
Formally, we have

p(zn = k|t1:n , a1:n ) ∼ p(an |zn = k, a1:n−1 ) · p(zn = k|t1:n ).

(7.12)
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We then derive a combined likelihood score for the most recent activity (tn , an ) given the
previously observed activity stream (t1 , a1 ), . . . , (tn−1 , an−1 ). The score is based on current
K modes and is formulated as

s(tn , an ) =

K
X
k=1

p(tn , an |zn = k, t1:n−1 , a1:n−1 ) · p(zn = k|t1:n , a1:n ) .
{z
} |
{z
}
|
intra-mode likelihood

(7.13)

mixture weight

Note that p(zn = k|t1:n , a1:n ) measures the mixture weight of (tn , an ) from mode k given the
whole activity sequence until (tn , an ) and p(tn , an |zn = k, t1:n−1 , a1:n−1 ) is the probability of
activity (tn , an ) occurring inside the given mode k. In our work, we assume time and type are
conditionally independent given the user mode zn and apply Eq. 7.9 to reduce the excessive
complications.
Algorithm 2 shows the framework of our insider activity detection. We assume the
first activity (t1 , a1 ) is normal. For each activity (tn , an ) s.t. n > 1, lines 3-5 illustrate whether
a new mode is needed for the upcoming activity. Lines 6-9 are the loop to iterate all of modes
we have at hand to calculate the corresponding likelihood scores under specific modes, the
mixture weights, and the final combined likelihood score. In particular, line 7 is for the computation of likelihood given a specific mode k; line 7 is for calculating the mixture weights
over all the modes. Then, a combined likelihood score of the activity is derived in line 9.
Given a predefined threshold , lines 10-15 are to evaluate whether activity (tn , an ) is malicious or not: if the combined likelihood score is below , it is labeled as an insider activity;
otherwise, it is normal.
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Algorithm 2: Insider Threat Detection via Dirichlet Marked Hawkes Process
Inputs : Activity stream (t1 , a1 ), . . . , (tn , an ), . . . , concentration factors λ0 ,
0

0

0

0

0

0

(α1 , α2 , . . . , αL ), (θ1 , θ2 , . . . , θD ), and insider likelihood threshold .
Outputs: Real-time insider activity detection report Y:

1 represents the insider

activity and 0 indicates the normal one.
1

Y ← list[0]; K ← 1

2

foreach each activity (tn , an ), n = 2, . . . do

3

Draw r ∼ Uniform(0,1) if r <

λ0
Pn−1
λ0 + i=1
γzi (tn ,ti )

then

Generate a new mode by Eq. 7.10 K ← K + 1

4
5

end

6

foreach k ∈ {1, . . . , K} do
Compute the likelihood of (tn , an ) in mode k by Eq. 7.9 Compute the weight of

7

mode k for (tn , an ) by Eq. 7.12
8

end

9

Compute the combined likelihood score s(tn , an ) by Eq. 7.13

10

if s(tn , an ) <  then
Y.insert(1)

11
12

end

13

else
Y.insert(0)

14
15

end

16

end

17

return Y

Our DMHP detection framework consists of two components, time and type. For an
ablation evaluation, we have listed three variants of our proposed model based on different
input information:
1. Time&type model takes both time and type information as input and it is exactly
depicted in Algorithm 2.
2. Type model only uses type information as input. To formulate this model, we need do
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the following adaptions based on Algorithm 2:
(a) In line 7, to derive likelihood score, we replace Eq. 7.9 with Eq. 7.8.
(b) In line 7, to calculate the mixture weights, we rewrite Eq. 7.12 as p(zn = k|t1:n , a1:n ) ∼
p(zn = k|a1:n ).
3. Time model only uses activity time information as input. Given Algorithm 2, we need
do the following adaptions:
(a) In line 7, to fix likelihood score, we replace Eq. 7.9 with Eq. 7.2.
(b) In line 7, for the computation of mixture weights, we rewrite Eq. 7.12 as p(zn =
k|t1:n , a1:n ) ∼ p(zn = k|t1:n ).
Given an observed activity stream (t1 , a1 ), . . . , (tn−1 , an−1 ), our goal is to judge whether
the most recent activity (tn , an ) is abnormal via a combined likelihood score. In this on-thefly detection, one challenge is how to efficiently derive the latent variables, user mode zn ,
from the posterior distribution p(zn = k|t1:n , a1:n ) (Eq. 7.12). To address this issue, we adopt
the idea of [93] that reuses the past samples from p(z1:n−1 |t1:n−1 , a1:n−1 ). Specifically, we apply the sequential Monte Carlo algorithm and take advantage of a set of C particles, each of
which represents a hypothesis of the latent mode and is sampled from a proposal distribution
q(z1:n |a1:n , t1:n ), to sequentially approximate the p(z1:n |a1:n , t1:n ). Moreover, it would be very
important that, for streaming data, the expected time cost of sampling the user mode zn and
updating the triggering kernel parameters αs should not grow with the amount of observed
activities. We set up a predefined window size and only consider the activities within the
observed window and neglect the ones outside the window.
Given an activity sequence, we apply a Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) to infer the
latent variables, i.e., user modes, in our DMHP framework. Generally speaking, the inference
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algorithm consists of two parts: sampling user modes and updating triggering kernel.

7.3.4

Sampling User Mode
Sequential Monte Carlo is used to get an approximation for the posterior p(zn |t1:n , a1:n )

in which a number of particles are maintained that each of particles refers to an instance
of latent variable (i.e., a hidden mode) and has a weight to tell how well this instance can
interpret the data. The weight of particle c at timestamp n goes as follows

φcn =

p(z1:n |a1:n , t1:n )
,
q(z1:n |a1:n , t1:n )

(7.14)

where c ∈ {1, . . . , C} and C is the total number of particles; p(·) is the true posterior distribution, and q(·) is the corresponding proposal distribution.
To minimize the variance of the resulting particle weight, we take the posterior distribution p(zn |z1:n−1 , a1:n , t1:n ) as the proposal distribution q(·). Then, given the weight of
particle c at timestamp n − 1, i.e. φcn−1 , the unnormalized weight φcn can be recursively
updated by
φcn = φcn−1 · p(an |znc , a1:n−1 ).

7.3.5

(7.15)

Updating Triggering Kernel
For a stream of activities (t1 , a1 ), . . . , (tn , an ), with current user activity (tn , an ), time

parameter αzn should be updated before the next activity is coming. Following the work [93],
0

0

0

a set of samples αs are drawn from a Dirichlet distribution, {αizn }N
i=1 ∼ Dir(α1 , α2 , . . . , αL )
where N is the sampling size and these αs are used to obtain an estimation of the time
parameter via maximizing the likelihood of activity streaming in terms of time information
(Eq. 6.5).
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Algorithm 3: Inference algorithm of the DMHP
1

2

Initialize φc1 to

1
C

for all c ∈ {1 . . . C} foreach each activity timing tn , n = 1, 2, . . . do

foreach c ∈ {1, . . . , C} do
if one activity type an occurs at the time tn then

3

sample mode zn with Eq. 7.12 update triggering kernel parameter α by the sampling

4

method stated above. update particle weights with Eq. 7.15
end

5

6

end

7

Normalize particle weights if ||φn ||−2
2 < threshold then
resample particles;

8

9

10

end
end

Algorithm 3 shows the sequential Monte Carlo framework for mode sampling and
triggering kernel updating. Line 1 initializes the particles and, for one specific activity, lines
3-9 iterate all of particles to sample the mode and update the time parameter: line 5 is for the
mode sampling, line 6 aims to trigger kernel updating, and line 7 is to update the particle
weights. In addition, lines 11-13 show the rules for particle resampling after the particle
weight normalization (line 10).

7.4
7.4.1

Experiments
Experiment Setup

Dataset. We adopt the CERT Insider Threat Dataset [62]. To describe employees’ action
behavior, instead of the five original coarse-grained categories for activities, we apply finegrained categories to describe the employees’ operations (Table 6.2).
The CERT dataset contains 3995 benign employees and 5 insiders. For each user, it
records activities from January 2010 to June 2011. On average, the number of activities for
each employee is around 40000. We preprocess the original dataset by joining all the log files,
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grouping them by each employee, and then sorting the activities of each employee based on
the recorded timestamps. We include all 5 insiders and randomly select 5 benign employees
in our experiment. Table 7.3 shows statistics for 5 insiders, the number of activities of each
insider in column 2 and the number of malicious activities of each insider in column 3. We
can see that malicious activities take up a very small percentage of all activities: ACM2278
with 0.0701% (22/31370), CDE1846 with 0.3549% (134/37754), CMP2946 with 0.3920%
(243/61989), MBG3183 with 0.0094% (4/42438), and PLJ1771 with 0.0858% (18/20964). It
is challenging to detect effective insider threat detection algorithm due to the extremely low
percentage of malicious activities.
In our experiment, we treat each employee’s activities as one sequence, each of which
is sorted by the activity occurrence time, and we have 10 streams which are from 5 insiders
above and 5 normal users randomly selected. We feed them into our proposed DMHP algorithm, one after another, and then obtain the combined likelihood score of each activity
for each specific employee dynamically. Given an empirical threshold , each activity in the
stream can be judged by the real-time combined likelihood score: it is labeled as an insider
activity if the corresponding combined likelihood score is less than τ ; otherwise, it is labeled
as a normal activity.
Hyperparameters. In all our experiments, we set the base intensity of Hawkes process
0

0

0

λ0 = 0.1, the concentration parameter of Dirichlet prior for Hawkes process (α1 , α2 , . . . , αL )
0

0

0

and that for categorical distribution (θ1 , θ2 , . . . , θD ), the number of RBF Kernels L = 7.
The typical reference time points τl for 7 kernels are 3, 7, 11, 24, 48, 96, 192 hours with
the corresponding bandwidths 1, 5, 7, 12, 24, 24, 24, respectively. We do not specify the
exact value of likelihood threshold ; instead we rank each activity based on its likelihood
value and report the number of real malicious activities in the certain percentage of ranked
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activities.
Baselines. Our DMHP time&type uses both type and time information in the modeling. In
our evaluation, we compare it with five baselines, DMHP time, DMHP type, Isolation Forest
[89], Local Outlier Factor [94], and ADeMS [95]. DMHP time only uses time information as
input and DMHP type only uses activity type information. Hence the comparison with these
two baselines can be considered as the ablation study. Isolation Forest and Local Outlier
Factor are two typical unsupervised anomaly detection methods. Isolation Forest detects
anomalies based on the concept of isolation without employing distance or density metrics
whereas Local Outlier Factor identifies anomalies by measuring the local deviation of a given
data point with respect to its neighbors. ADeMS is one of recent state-of-the-art streamingbased anomaly detection algorithms. ADeMS maintains a set of few orthogonal vectors to
capture the prior from the historical non-anomalous data points and use a reconstruction
error test to evaluate the anomaly of upcoming data. On the implementation, we take use
of the corresponding scikit-learn packages for Isolation Forest and Local Outlier Factor, and
the GitHub implementation for ADeMS. To adapt the input of baselines, for CERT dataset,
we encode each activity by a 42-D vector in which 24-D is for time and 18-D is for activity
types.
Training & testing. The activities in the first one and a half months are used to train the
proposed model and baselines. We think the dynamic models would stabilize after training
with activities of the first 1.5 months. All the rest activities (16.5 months) are employed for
evaluation. In all models, we also treat all WWW visit activities as normal as WWW visit
activities trivially contribute to the insider threat detection.
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Table 7.2: Category-specific AUC values for compared models
Time&type
Type
Time
Local outlier factor
Isolation Forest
ADeMS

Logon
0.9592
0.6931
0.4982
0.7622
0.8352
0.9437

Email
0.9314
0.4931
0.5970
0.6811
0.9260
0.9204

Http
0.9844
0.7616
0.4405
0.8188
0.8180
0.9533

Device
0.9535
0.6884
0.4392
0.6194
0.8462
0.9334

File
0.9585
0.7907
0.4738
0.8831
0.8797
0.9457

Table 7.3: Statistics of insiders: the total number of activities and the number of true
malicious activities located in the top 15% of total activities with the lowest combined
likelihood scores.
Insider

Total
activity
#

ACM2278
CDE1846
CMP2946
MBG3183
PLJ1771

31370
37754
61989
42438
20964

7.4.2

Total
malicious
activity
#
22
134
94
4
15

Time
model

Type
model

0
26
13
0
0

22
76
23
4
9

Time
&
Type
model
22
134
91
4
15

Isolation
forest

Local
outlier
factor

5
134
48
0
11

7
83
25
4
6

ADeMS
22
130
72
4
11

Malicious Insider Activity Detection
Figure 7.1 shows the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves and the corre-

sponding area under the ROC curve (AUC) values of our DMHP models (time&type, type,
time), Local Outlier Factor, and Isolation Forest. We can see that our DMHP time&type
achieves the best accuracy with the AUC value of 0.9509, which is significantly higher than
time (AUC 0.5031) and type (AUC 0.6530). The reason behind this can summarized as follows. First, our time model is a self-exciting Hawkes process that the occurrence likelihood of
a new event increases due to the just occurred events (Eq. 6.6); therefore, if series of malicious
activities occur consecutively in a very short period of time, e.g., the malicious activities of
ACM2278 shown in the Table 7.4, our time model tends to provide high likelihoods for these
malicious activities. Second, in general, our type model is a frequency-based model that it
tends to assign a high (low) likelihood to the activity type with a high (low) frequency.
Notably, in CERT dataset, some of malicious activities are of high-frequency, e.g., email-in,
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Figure 7.1: ROC for insider malicious activity detection
email-out or website visit, which makes the type model difficult to achieve high accuracy.
However, as shown in Figure 7.3, our time&type model, which combines the time and type
models, assigns a smaller likelihood to the malicious activity. This demonstrates the advantage of combining both activity type and time information in sequence modeling for insider
threat detection. In addition, our DMHP time&type also significantly outperforms Local
Outlier Factor (AUC 0.7243), Isolation Forest (AUC 0.8757), and ADeMS (AUC 0.9347).
For a comprehensive evaluation, we report in Table 7.2 the corresponding AUC values
from all compared models for each of the five log categories, i.e., logon, email, http, device,
and file.
We can observe that time&type obtains the highest AUC values in all five categories,
logon 0.9592, email 0.9314, http 0.9844, device 0.9535, and file 0.9585. For baselines, Isolation
Forest and ADeMS both perform well on all of activity types, while Local Outlier Factor
achieves good AUC values in http and file but poor AUC values in logon, email and device.
We also observe that DMHP with time information alone does not achieve good performance
across all five categories.
We also show in Table 7.3 a detailed comparison of model performance for each
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insider. We calculate the number of true malicious activities in the top 15% activities with the
lowest combined likelihood scores from each model. As shown in columns 2-3, the malicious
activities take up a very small percentage of activities of insiders. Moreover, those malicious
activities are often hidden among normal activities and occur in a long period. Our time&type
achieves highest recalls for all insiders except CMP2946. Concretely, it captures 22 real
malicious activities for ACM2278 with recall 22/22 = 100%, 128 real malicious activities for
CDE1846 with recall 134/134 = 100%, 91 real malicious activities for CMP2946 with recall
91/94 = 96.80%, 4 real malicious activities for MBG3183 with recall 4/4 = 100%, 15 real
malicious activities for PLJ1771 with recall 15/15 = 100%. Generally, ADeMs also performs
well in the malicious activity detection via likelihood score ranking. Isolation Forest achieves
its highest recall 100% for CDE1846. However, it obtains fairly low recall values for other
insiders, e.g., ACM2278 22.72% and MBG3183 0%. This is because malicious activities in
ACM2278 and MBG3183 are heavily associated with http and Isolation Forest seems to be
not good at capturing http behavior pattern, which is demonstrated by the comparably lower
AUC in Table 7.2.

7.4.3

Case Study
In accordance with Table 7.3, the high recall values provided by DMHP time&type

model in the top 15% activities lead us to a hypothesis that DMHP time&type has a tendency
to assign low (high) combined likelihood scores to the malicious (normal) activities and this
point can be supported by the comparison of empirical distributions between normal and
malicious activities shown in Figure 7.4.3 and 7.4.3. To further testify our hypothesis and
provide a clear picture for malicious activity detection, we focus on one insider, ACM2278,
as a case study.
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With the scenario design of CRET dataset, we learn that ACM2278 refers to an
insider who did not previously use removable drives or work after hours begins logging in
after hours, using a removable drive, and uploading data to wikileaks.org and then, leaves
the organization shortly thereafter. There are 22 malicious activities carried by ACM2278,
which form two concrete instances of insider behavior pattern: one instance is from activities
1 to 12 and another is from activities 13 to 22. For reproducibility purpose, we list them in
Table 7.4. In both attack instances, the insider logs on the company’s computer after work,
connects the removable drives to computer, uploads data, and finally ends at the next day’s
morning before the working hour.
Table 7.4: Malicious insider activities of ACM2278 (Activities 1-12 and 13-22 form two
attack instances).
Activity ID
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

2010-08-18
2010-08-18
2010-08-19
2010-08-19
2010-08-19
2010-08-19
2010-08-19
2010-08-19
2010-08-19
2010-08-19
2010-08-19
2010-08-19
2010-08-24
2010-08-24
2010-08-24
2010-08-24
2010-08-24
2010-08-24
2010-08-24
2010-08-24
2010-08-24
2010-08-24

Activity event
21:47:42 Weekday Logon After
22:59:20 Connect After
01:34:19 WebsiteUpload
01:34:19 File jpg
01:37:20 WebsiteUpload
01:37:20 File jpg
01:38:10 WebsiteUpload
01:38:10 File txt
01:46:04 WebsiteUpload
01:46:04 File zip
05:23:05 Disconnect
06:10:59 Logoff
01:02:58 Weekday Logon After
03:24:16 Connect After
03:48:51 WebsiteUpload
03:48:51 File jpg
03:43:48 WebsiteUpload
03:43:48 File doc
03:34:21 WebsiteUpload
03:34:21 File txt
04:15:32 Disconnect
04:20:39 Logoff

Table 7.5 shows the performance of insider threat detection provided by all models
for ACM2278. We report the recall value calculated in the top 3% percent of activities with
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Table 7.5: Malicious insider activities detected by different models for ACM2278 in top 3%
percent of activities with the lowest combined likelihood scores
Time model
Type model
Time&type model
Isolation Forest
Local Outlier Factor
ADeMS

# of activities
0
19
22
1
7
22

Detected activity IDs
1-6, 8, 10-17,19-22
1-22
12
2, 11, 12, 14, 17, 21, 22
1-22

the lowest combined likelihood scores from each model. In accordance with Table 7.5, we
can see that DMHP time&type model and ADeMS both perform well and they detect all 22
malicious insider activities in the top 3% percent of alerted activities; type model performs
better than the other two baselines with recall 19/22 = 86.36% while time and Isolation
Forest perform poor.

(a) Time

(b) Type

(c) Time & Type

Figure 7.2: Histogram of combined likelihood scores for malicious activities of ACM2278

(a) Time

(b) Type

(c) Time & Type

Figure 7.3: Histogram of combined likelihood scores for normal activities of ACM2278

Table 6.2 shows the 18 fine-grained categories in our evaluation and each category is
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one activity type. Figure 7.2 shows the histogram of combined likelihood scores for malicious
activities of ACM2278 : (7.4.3), (7.4.3) and (7.4.3) refer to the corresponding histogram of
DMHP with time, type and time&type as input, respectively. Figure 7.4.3 shows that the
combined likelihood scores of malicious activities mainly lie in two intervals [0.5, 0.6] and
[0.7, 0.9] from time. Similarly, we show in Figure 7.3 the histogram of combine likelihood
scores for normal activities, in which (7.4.3), (7.4.3) and (7.4.3) indicate the corresponding
histogram with time, type and time & type as input.
In Figure 7.4.3, we can see the empirical distribution of normal activities roughly has
two peaks with 0.3 and 0.7 as center. In this case, combine likelihood scores of malicious and
normal activities are interleaved together and it is hard to find a judge threshold to separate
them clearly, which results in a low AUC for time model shown in Figure 7.1. Figure 7.4.3
shows that the combine likelihood scores of insider-threat malicious activities for type ranges
between 0.7 and 0.9, while the ones of normal activities mainly spread from 0.9 to 1.0 in
accordance with Figure 7.4.3. Exactly, we can see that type model can generally separate
malicious and normal activities, which results in a good recall for ACM2278 shown in Table
7.3. From Figures 7.4.3 and 7.4.3, we can clearly observe that the combined likelihood scores
of malicious activities from time&type model concentrates on the extreme left part of the
empirical distribution of normal activities. As a result, time&type model produces a high
AUC value as shown in Figures 7.1. In addition, we can see ADeMS also performs well with
22 activities included in top 3% percent.

7.4.4

Wikipedia Vandal Detection
To further evaluate the performance of our DMHP model, we conduct a different task,

i.e., detecting vandalism on Wikipedia on the UMDWikipedia dataset [11]. In Wikipedia,
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Figure 7.4: ROC curve of malicious edit detection
Table 7.6: The performance of malicious activity and hidden user detection with various λ0
values on page “List of metro systems”, in which AMI refers to ‘Adjusted Mutual Information’ and NMI denotes ‘Normalized Mutual Information’
λ0
0.00001
0.001
0.01
0.1
0.2
0.3

# of predicted modes
10
16
16
20
22
32

AUC
0.8440
0.8464
0.8464
0.8815
0.8031
0.6719

AMI
0.4446
0.3146
0.3146
0.2352
0.2163
0.1464

V-measure
0.6287
0.5001
0.5001
0.4075
0.3840
0.2887

Homogeneity
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

NMI
0.6771
0.5774
0.5774
0.5058
0.4875
0.4107

each article page is edited by users including certified editors and volunteers. Each edit contains various attributes such as page ID, title, time, categories, page type, revert status, and
content. Because Wikipedia is based on crowdsourcing mechanism and applies the freedomto-edit model (i.e., any user can edit any article), it leads to a rapid growth of vandalism
(deliberate attempts to damage or compromise integrity). Those vandals who commit acts
of vandalism can be considered as insiders in the community of Wikipedia contributors.
Note that user edits in Wikipedia are in principle similar to user activities in insider
threat detection that are recorded in log files.
In this experiment, we focus on three pages, “List of metro systems”, “Star Trek
Into Darkness”, and “St. Louis Cardinals”. For each page, we collect all edits from all of
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its contributors (including vandals). Each page has more than 300 edits and at least three
malicious edits. Specifically, if an edit is reverted by bots or certified editors, we consider it
malicious. We define two types of activities based on whether the edit is on a content page
or a meta page. The reason we treat the edits of each page (rather than of a contributor)
as a sequence is to have the ground truth of user modes. In this setting, the number of user
modes is the same as the number of contributors and the edits from the same contributor
can be considered as activities under a user mode in DMHP. To adapt the input of baselines,
we embed each activity by a 26-D vector with 24-D for time and 2-D for activity types.
Experiment Results. Figure 7.4 shows the ROC curve of malicious edit detection. We can
observe that our DMHP time&type significantly outperforms baselines in terms of AUC on
malicious edit detection. Similar to results on the CERT dataset, with combining activity
types and time information, time&type achieves higher AUC value than the model using
activity type or time alone. We also observe that, in constrast with CERT dataset, baselines (especially Isolation Forest) achieve poor performances on Wikipedia dataset. This is
because Isolation Forest is based on attribute-wise analysis so that it tends to fail when
the distribution for anomalous points becomes less discriminative, e.g., if the anomalous
and non-anomalous points share similar attribute range or distribution [96]. Compared with
CRET dataset, activity type information in Wikipedia dataset is subtle with only choices of
meta page or not, which, to some extent, is not sufficient to discriminate whether or not an
activity is malicious.
We further select the page “List of metro systems” for our case study. The edit
sequence consists of 396 edits from 6 contributors, among which there are 20 malicious edits.
Table 7.6 shows the performance of malicious edit detection with various λ0 values. Our
DMHP time&type achieves good performance on detecting malicious edits on the page with
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AUC=0.8815 when λ0 = 0.1. A further investigation shows that our time&type model can
detect 12 out of 20 malicious edits in 10% of total edits with the lowest combined likelihood
scores.
Sensitivity of Hyperparameters We focus on the question whether the detection performance of our DMHP is sensitive to hyperparameters. From Eq. 7.10, we can see that the
base intensity λ0 mainly determines whether a new mode is created or not for an upcoming
activity. In other words, λ0 affects the number of modes which may further affect the detection performance. We can observe from columns 1-2 in Table 7.6 that the number of modes
increases with the increment of λ0 . This is because, as shown in Eq. 7.10, the bigger λ0 is,
the higher probability of creating a new cluster will be. Concretely, the empirical quantity
relation between the number of modes and λ0 follows the rule: as λ0 approaches to 0, the
number of modes goes to 1; it goes to the total number of activities in the stream as λ0
approaches to +∞ [97].
To disclose the relationship between the number of modes and the detection accuracy,
we report the changes of AUC values with variation of λ0 in column 3 of Table 7.6. We can
see when λ0 ranges from 0.00001 to 0.1, the AUC values do not change much although the
number of predicted hidden users (modes) increases accordingly. This is because, as λ0 is
0.00001, the number of predicted users is 10 that is larger than the ground-truth number of
real contributors. In other words, the model tries to distinguish different editing styles in a
fine-grained manner even if these edits are actually from the same user. As a result, the AUC
values slightly increase from 0.8440 to 0.8815. However, if the λ0 keeps increasing, we can
observe a significant reduction of AUC values. This is because the number of the predicted
user is too large compared with ground-truth, which is out of a reasonable range. In this
case, the model has already been overfitted, so it is very important to choose an appropriate
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value for λ0 which is sensitive.
To study why the number of predicted hidden users (modes) does not affect much the
detection performance when λ0 ranges from 0.00001 to 0.1, we further adopt four clustering
metrics, Adjusted Mutual Information, V-measure, Homogeneity, and Normalized Mutual
Information, to evaluate the performance of our time&type model on the cluster result.
Note that we have the ground truth about which contributor (mode) each edit is from
for UMDWikipedia data. From Table 7.6, we can observe that with the increasing of the
predicted number of modes, the values of all clustering metrics except Homogeneity decrease.
However, the Homogeneity scores are always 1 with different λ0 values, which indicates that
each mode contains edits from one single user. This explains why the detection performance
in terms of AUC is insensitive to the parameter value of the base intensity λ0 in the range
of (0.00001, 0.1).

7.5

Summary
In this chapter, we have developed the Dirichlet Marked Hawkes Process (DMHP)

framework for insider threat detection. Our experiments on two datasets show that DMHP
can assign low likelihoods to malicious activities and achieve a good performance in terms
of AUC.
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8

Conclusions and Future Work

In this chapter, we summarize our works and, based on the observed results and performance analysis, propose several potential research directions on dynamic fraud detection.

8.1

Conclusions
Around dynamic fraud detection, in this dissertation, the works are delivered by the

clues: (1) how to build a machine learning model with only positive samples, (2) how to
avail few negative samples to improve the discrimination capability of the trained model,
(3) how to utilize the late-response labels for fraud early detection and (4) how to develop
a multi-scale fraud detection method to capture the subtle and time-evolving misbehavior.
Aiming to solve the above challenges, we have done the works as follows.
In Chapter 3, our proposed method OCAN works for one-class fraud detection as
only benign users are available during the training phase. During training, OCAN adopts
LSTM-Autoencoder to learn benign user representations, and then uses the benign user
representations to train a complementary GAN model. The generator of complementary
GAN can generate complementary benign user representations that are in the low-density
regions of real benign user representations, while the discriminator is trained to distinguish
the real and complementary benign users. After training, the discriminator is able to detect
malicious users which are outside the regions of benign users.
In Chapter 4, we propose a novel framework combining the idea of self-supervised
pre-training and metric-based few-shot learning to detect insiders. First, our framework is
pre-trained on a large amount of user activity data to obtain prior knowledge about user
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behaviors. Then, it is fine-tuned to derive a similarity function which is to give a higher
similarity score between the oncoming insider and the observed insiders.
In Chapter 5, we propose a survival analysis based fraud early detection model, SAFE,
which maps dynamic user activities to survival probabilities that are guaranteed to be monotonically decreasing along time. SAFE adopts recurrent neural network (RNN) to handle user
activity sequences and directly outputs hazard values at each timestamp, and then, survival
probability derived from hazard values is deployed to achieve consistent predictions. Because
we only observe the user suspended time instead of the fraudulent activity time in the training data, we revise the loss function of the regular survival model to achieve fraud early
detection.
In Chapter 6, we propose a hierarchical neural temporal point process model by
combining the temporal point processes and recurrent neural networks for insider threat
detection. Our model is capable of capturing a general nonlinear dependency over the history
of all activities by the two-level structure that effectively models activity times, activity types,
session durations, and session intervals information.
In Chapter 7, we present a Dirichlet Marked Hawkes Process (DMHP) to detect
malicious activities from insiders in real-time. DMHP combines the Dirichlet process and
marked Hawkes processes to model the sequence of user activities. Dirichlet process is capable
of detecting unbounded user modes (patterns) of an infinite user activities, while for each
detected user mode, one set of marked Hawkes processes is adopted to model user activities
from time and activity type information so that different user modes are modeled by different
sets of marked Hawkes processes. To achieve real-time malicious insider activity detection,
the likelihood of occurrence of the most recent activity calculated from the DMHP is adopted
as a score to measure the maliciousness of the activity. Since the majority of user activities
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are benign, those activities with low likelihoods are labeled as malicious activities.

8.2

Future Work
Based on the works which have been done, we propose multiple potential future works

with a focus on the following aspects.
Unavailability of labeled data. In this direction, we have conducted two works: a one-class
adversarial net for only positive samples and a few-shot learning model for the extremely
imbalanced dataset with few negative samples. We are thinking and attempting to: (1)
generate more high-quality negative samples to improve the discrimination capability of the
few-shot learning model in the fine-tuning phase; (2) with few negative samples, introduce
few-shot learning into one-class adversarial net to aid the latter to describe a more clear
decision boundary. Recently, some related studies have occurred [98, 99, 100].
Lack of high-quality labels. To address this issue, we have developed a neural survival
analysis model for fraud early detection with the late-response labels. However, it is still
limited in one aspect: pivoting on the platform’s suspicion actions we observed, SAFE can
take the early detection in general but it still can not quantify the extent to which, in
training phase, the records should be detected in advance. Therefore, it could be a potential
research point to accurately formulate how many timestamps before the event point should
be considered in the training.
Multi-scale detection frameworks. Hierarchical RNN takes advantage of Hawkes process
to capture the time information. One limitation is that as a self-exciting model, it can
not fit the scenario: the most recent event decreases the probability of event occurrence
rather than increasing. Therefore, it will be an interesting research point how to combine
self-exciting process and self-correcting process [54] to comprehensively describe the time-
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evolving behavior for fraud detection.
DMHP framework can seamlessly integrate more information about user activities.
For example, we can incorporate topic modeling in DMHP to model the content information
such as the emails or surfed Web pages. We plan to extend our framework to capture those
content and contextual information in our future work. We also emphasize that our introduced user mode in DMHP can help accurately model a user’s activity sequence because
in practice one user often has multiple roles and different working patterns. In our future
work, we will conduct more studies to learn how various parameter settings in DMHP (e.g.,
base intensity, concentration parameters, reference time) affect the number of modes and the
detection accuracy. In our DMHP models, we introduce the use of a user specified threshold
to judge whether the most recent activity is malicious or not. In fact, it is difficult to specify
the appropriate threshold value since the threshold may be different for different users and
should also dynamically change along the time. We plan to study how to adjust the threshold
values dynamically based on the capacity of examining the alerted fraudulent activities each
day.
Efficient Implementation. We have not taken much discussion on scalability for the proposed frameworks, and one of main reasons is due to the scale of input data. Instead of
large-scale data, the evaluation datasets in this dissertation are only collections in a specific
short period of time. Efficient implementation definitely is a key criteria for dynamic fraud
detection. Therefore, it would be an important research direction how to improve the efficiency of the proposed frameworks in a real productive environment. Concretely, if RNN is
leveraged to adapt the input of sequential data, we can consider a sliding window mechanism
and just take into account the most recent records. Also, as for DMHP, we could explore
different posterior approximations for a higher implementation efficiency.
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